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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Putting a Price on Carbon: A Handbook for U.S. 
Policymakers is the first in a series of papers that the 
World Resources Institute will produce with the aim of 
providing a clear and comprehensive understanding of 
the key issues that will need to be addressed if the United 
States ultimately imposes a national price on carbon. The 
Handbook lays out what is already known about the design 
and effects of different approaches to pricing carbon, with a 
focus on carbon taxes and cap-and-trade programs.
We believe that pricing carbon should be a core element 
of the United States’ long-term strategy for achieving 
significant reductions in greenhouse gas emissions in the 
coming decades. However, in writing the Handbook, we 
recognize that many who are, or could become, interested 
in carbon pricing might be motivated by the potential 
for benefits that are unrelated to climate change. Carbon 
price programs can be designed with an eye toward other 
possible policy goals, such as reforming the tax code to be 
more efficient. Even when carbon pricing is approached 
with non-climate priorities in mind, the emission reduc-
tion potential provides an insurance policy against the risk 
of significant climate impacts.
The Handbook provides an overview of carbon pricing—
the types of decisions that need to be made in designing a 
program (including the political decisions about the use of 
revenue) and the expected economic impacts of alternative 
approaches. We conducted a thorough review of the 
literature, selecting a broad array of well-regarded and 
highly cited studies that represent a range of viewpoints. 
We expect this Handbook to be useful in the public 
debate in the United States on whether, how, and when to 
implement a national carbon price. 
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The Basics of Pricing Carbon
Greenhouse gas emissions impose costs on the global 
community via climate change. A carbon price shifts the 
burden of these costs from society as a whole to the enti-
ties responsible for the emissions, providing an incentive 
to decrease carbon emissions.
Pricing carbon increases the prices of goods across the 
economy in proportion to their carbon content, and thus 
in proportion to their effect on climate change. By raising 
the relative price of carbon-intensive goods (for example, 
fossil fuels), a carbon price encourages individuals and 
businesses to purchase less carbon-intensive alternatives. 
A carbon price would lead to reductions in U.S. green-
house gas emissions and create leverage to encourage 
other countries to reduce their emissions, both of which 
are necessary to prevent the more severe effects of climate 
change. In addition, reduced fossil fuel usage will provide 
“co-benefits” in the form of reduced emissions of other 
harmful air pollutants.   
While pricing carbon implies higher prices for certain 
goods, the additional costs to individuals and businesses 
become an additional source of revenue that can either 
be returned to households or spent in other productive 
ways. Among other possibilities, carbon-pricing revenues 
can be used to promote economic growth, advance low-
carbon technologies and other activities that help respond 
to climate change, and reduce adverse economic effects of 
the carbon price. 
The following are some of the specific potential uses of 
carbon pricing revenues:
 ▪ TAX CUTS. The revenues from carbon pricing could be 
used to fund cuts in other tax rates. Taxes on labor 
and capital can reduce the income of individuals 
and businesses and decrease incentives to engage in 
productive activities such as work and investment. 
Such taxes differ from a carbon tax, which corrects 
for a market failure and reduces the incentive to emit 
harmful greenhouse gases. 
 ▪ RETURNING MONEY TO HOUSEHOLDS OR ELECTRICITY 
CONSUMERS. Revenue from carbon pricing could be 
returned to households by sending them “lump sum” 
payments, which could be divided equally or by some 
alternative metric. This “tax-and-dividend” approach 
has gained popularity largely because of its perceived 
fairness and simplicity. Households could be provided 
with tax refunds or sent quarterly or annual checks. 
In California, some money from the cap-and-trade 
allowance auctions is returned to electricity custom-
ers in the form of rebates on their bills. These types of 
approaches could also ensure that low-income house-
holds receive at least as much in income as they spend 
on the tax. 
 ▪ DEFICIT REDUCTION. Large national deficits can reduce 
economic growth rates by increasing interest rates, 
inhibiting (or “crowding out”) private sector invest-
ments, and increasing future tax burdens to pay off 
the principal or interest on the debt. Carbon pricing 
revenues could be used to reduce annual deficits and 
thereby help to avoid such adverse economic effects. 
 ▪ INVESTING IN COMBATING CLIMATE CHANGE. In addition 
to its potential to stimulate innovation in low-carbon 
technologies (for example, renewable energy), a 
carbon price can provide revenue to help promote the 
development and deployment of breakthrough tech-
nologies. In addition, carbon-pricing revenues can be 
used to invest in infrastructure that helps communi-
ties adapt to the effects of climate change that are now 
unavoidable (extreme weather, sea level rise, etc.).    
 ▪ TRANSITIONAL ASSISTANCE. A portion of the revenues 
can be used to assist those likely to be most adversely 
affected by a carbon price. Job training can be provided 
to workers in industries with anticipated job losses 
(for example, coal mining). In addition, revenues can 
be disproportionately allocated to households and 
business in regions of the country that are most heav-
ily dependent on the production or consumption of 
fossil fuels in order to smooth the transition to a lower 
carbon economy. Revenues can also be used to pro-
vide assistance to industries that might face increased 
competition from foreign competitors.
Many other ways are available to make use of carbon-
pricing revenue. While many advocates strongly favor 
one or another particular approach to the use of revenue, 
existing or proposed carbon-pricing policies often include 
a mixture of approaches in accordance with the compro-
mises and trade-offs required to pass such far-reaching 
legislation.  
Carbon Taxes versus Cap-and-Trade
This Handbook focuses on the two main approaches to 
pricing carbon: carbon taxes and cap-and-trade programs. 
A carbon tax is a fee added to the price of goods in propor-
tion to their carbon content. A cap-and-trade program 
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entails setting a maximum level of carbon emissions, with 
emissions allowances issued by regulators up to this cap 
that can be bought or sold. Under a cap-and-trade pro-
gram, the carbon price is equal to the market price of the 
emissions allowances. 
If properly designed and implemented, both carbon taxes 
and cap-and-trade programs provide incentives to under-
take the lowest cost abatement opportunities (those less 
expensive than paying the carbon price). In addition, car-
bon taxes and cap-and-trade programs require a number 
of similar decisions to be made in the design process.  
While the effects of comparably stringent carbon taxes and 
cap-and-trade programs are virtually identical in theory, 
a number of practical differences exist between the two 
policy instruments. A carbon tax is in some ways simpler 
than a cap-and-trade program. A tax does not require the 
government to allocate or conduct auctions for emissions 
allowances, or monitor the trading of allowances, and 
regulated entities do not need to participate in auctions or 
secondary markets for allowance trading.
The major advantage of a cap-and-trade program is that 
the policy sets a firm limit on the quantity of emissions 
that will be allowed. Therefore, when climate change goals 
are stated in terms of emissions levels, the emissions cap 
can ensure the goal will be achieved. A carbon tax can-
not guarantee a certain emissions path, but it will lead to 
a certain price pathway. Regulated entities might prefer 
that approach to the less stable prices of a cap-and-trade 
program, which can make business planning more dif-
ficult. To that end, cap-and-trade programs may include 
“ceilings” and/or “floors” on allowances prices to reduce 
price volatility. 
Carbon-Pricing Policies and Proposals
While the concept of carbon pricing dates back to eco-
nomic theory from the early 20th century, in practice, 
carbon-pricing programs were first developed in the early 
1990s when four Scandinavian countries implemented 
taxes on carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions. In the United 
States, the Clinton administration proposed a tax on the 
energy content of fuels that would have been similar to a 
carbon tax, but the proposal was controversial and with-
drawn in 1993.1 
Also in the 1990s, the United States implemented the 
Acid Rain Program, which put in place a cap-and-trade 
program for sulfur dioxide emissions in the United States.2 
While not focused on carbon emissions, the Acid Rain 
Program provided proof of concept for cap and trade, 
which has since been used for pricing carbon. 
The European Union established its Emissions Trading 
Scheme in 2005, which is the world’s largest CO2 cap-and-
trade program.3 The EU-ETS went through a rocky initial 
phase, which saw prices collapse due, in part, to the over-
allocation of allowances. However, the program has since 
achieved a stable market for allowances and meaningful 
emissions reductions, and has provided useful lessons for 
other cap-and-trade programs developed elsewhere. 
Back in the United States, starting with the Climate 
Stewardship Act of 2003, Congress has seen numerous 
carbon pricing proposals, many with bipartisan sponsor-
ship and support. The 111th Congress (2009 and 2010) 
was the high-water mark for these proposals, when the 
American Clean Energy and Security Act (ACES) cap-
and-trade program (also known as “Waxman-Markey” 
after its two principal co-sponsors) was approved by the 
House of Representatives. While several companion bills 
were introduced in the Senate during that Congress, none 
moved to a floor vote. Additional carbon-pricing bills have 
been introduced in Congress since 2010, but none has 
been given serious consideration.
With little prospect of comprehensive federal action on 
climate change in the mid-2000s, many U.S. states began 
to plan their own state or regional cap-and-trade pro-
grams. The first was the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initia-
tive (RGGI), a cap-and-trade program for CO2 emissions 
from power plants, launched in 2009 by ten northeastern 
states (New Jersey has since withdrawn). Various western 
U.S. states and Canadian provinces created the Western 
Climate Initiative (WCI) in 2007 and jointly agreed on 
design principles for a regional cap-and-trade program. 
While the WCI was never able to implement the regional 
program, California and Quebec currently operate a linked 
cap-and-trade program that covers 85 percent of the emis-
sions in each jurisdiction. Ontario recently announced its 
intent to establish a cap-and-trade program and link it 
with California and Quebec as part of the WCI.4 In addi-
tion, WCI member British Columbia established a carbon 
tax in 2008 that is currently C$30 per ton of CO2 across 
sectors representing 70 percent of total emissions.
Nearly 40 countries and over 26 sub-national jurisdictions 
have implemented either a carbon tax or a greenhouse-
gas cap-and-trade program; these include seven pilot 
programs in China. Together, these programs cover 
approximately 12 percent of global greenhouse gas (GHG) 
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emissions. In contrast to the situation a decade ago, if the 
United States were to establish a national carbon price it 
would no longer be a lone actor; instead, it would be join-
ing a growing community of nations committed to reduc-
ing global greenhouse gas emissions with cost-effective 
climate-change policies. 
Carbon Pricing Design Features
Establishing a carbon pricing program requires many 
decisions on policy structure and design. Some of the main 
design elements of a carbon-pricing policy are highlighted 
below. Each element is relevant to both a carbon tax and a 
cap-and-trade program.
 ▪ SCOPE. Scope refers to the portion of overall green-
house gas emissions covered by the program. Deter-
mining a program’s scope requires policymakers to 
decide: (1) whether the program covers only CO2 or 
other greenhouse gases as well; (2) which economic 
sectors are covered by the program; and (3) whether 
all emitters or only those above a certain threshold of 
emissions are regulated. The broader the scope, the 
greater the emissions reductions that will be expected 
from a given carbon price. A broader scope also im-
plies that a given quantity of emissions reductions will 
be achieved at a lower cost.
 ▪ POINT OF REGULATION. Carbon pricing can be applied at 
different points in the economy. Under an “upstream” 
approach, the carbon price is applied where the ma-
terials that will result in the emissions first enter the 
economy (for example, at the coal mine, the oil or gas 
drilling site, or the entry point of fuel imports). Such 
an approach enables a large fraction of energy CO2 
emissions to be covered while regulating relatively few 
entities. A “downstream” approach applies the carbon 
price at the point where the emissions actually occur. 
This is straightforward to implement for power plants 
and manufacturing facilities, but far more difficult for 
individual buildings, cars, and trucks. A program may 
also include a mixture of upstream and downstream 
approaches, or “midstream” approaches (for example, 
oil refineries and natural gas processing plants).  
 ▪ REPORTING AND VERIFICATION. A key prerequisite for a 
successful carbon pricing policy is a robust emissions 
reporting and verification system. Reliable reporting 
systems are often already in place for other purposes. 
Because the addition of a carbon price creates direct 
economic consequences for both the covered entity—
which wants to minimize its tax burden—and the 
government, verification of the emissions reports is 
essential. Different approaches to that verification are 
possible—from independent third party verification to 
self-certification with strong penalties.
 ▪ SETTING THE PRICE OR CAP. Carbon tax and cap-and-
trade programs require setting pathways of prices 
or emissions caps. Setting the level of the tax or cap 
will likely require balancing a variety of political, 
economic, and environmental considerations. From a 
climate perspective, one can start from either consid-
eration of emission targets or from estimates of the 
damages caused by GHG emissions. For non-climate 
policy priorities (for example, tax reform), setting 
the price might have more to do with the amount of 
revenue needed to serve those priorities. It is common 
to increase the stringency of a program gradually over 
time to allow businesses and consumers to adjust, and 
to maintain some flexibility to adjust the price or cap 
in the event that conditions change.
Various additional factors must also be considered. For 
example, allowing “offsets” (emissions reductions from 
entities that are not directly covered by the policy, for 
example, enhanced carbon sinks achieved by tree plant-
ing) can reduce the costs of a policy, but can also make the 
emissions reductions more difficult to verify. 
Policymakers should also consider the broader policy con-
text in which carbon pricing is introduced, including any 
complementary policies that might be needed to further 
reduce emissions or costs. 
Economics of Carbon Pricing
The body of literature on the economic effects of carbon 
pricing programs is wide and deep. Economists have con-
ducted both benefit-cost and economic-impact analyses to 
assess the effects of carbon taxes on society as a whole and 
on individual sectors, regions, and income levels. While 
there are serious limitations to economic models (see  
Section 6 for detail), economic theory and empirical 
results can nonetheless offer important lessons to policy-
makers as they design carbon-pricing programs.  
Benefit-Cost Analysis
The most important finding of economic theory related 
to carbon pricing is also the most basic: when an activity 
such as emitting greenhouse gases causes harm that is not 
reflected in the prices of goods and services (what econo-
mists call a “negative externality”), pricing that activity 
leads to reductions in the activity and to overall gains 
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in welfare. The price corrects for the market failure (the 
harm caused is internalized in the costs of the goods and 
services). Indeed, economic studies show that the optimal 
carbon price is potentially very large.5 
Climate change is a challenging economic problem, in part 
because benefits are global in nature while policy costs 
are local. This dilemma has caused some to question the 
benefits achievable from a carbon price established by 
any single country. On the other hand, many nations and 
sub-national jurisdictions have already put a carbon price 
in place. The United States is responsible for a significant 
portion of global greenhouse-gas emissions, and U.S. 
adoption of a carbon price could help spur broader multi-
national action to combat climate change. 
Comparisons of the benefits and costs of carbon pric-
ing should take account of benefits unrelated to climate 
change. For example, reduced fossil fuel usage provides 
substantial “co-benefits” in the form of reduced emissions 
of other harmful air pollutants. In addition, the carbon 
pricing revenues can be used in a variety of ways to benefit 
the economy and boost economic growth. 
For all these reasons, economists overwhelmingly support 
a well-designed national carbon tax. In 2012, a University 
of Chicago survey asked 40 prominent economists from 
across the political spectrum whether they would prefer 
the government to raise revenue through traditional 
income taxes or via a national carbon tax. Not one chose 
the income tax approach.6  
Economic Impacts 
While economists largely agree that many uses of carbon-
pricing revenues can promote long-term prosperity, 
determining whether a carbon price will be beneficial to 
the U.S. economy in the short run is a more difficult ques-
tion. A significant portion of the welfare gains will accrue 
outside the economy (if these gains are measured tradi-
tionally, using metrics such as national GDP) and will not 
be realized until far into the future. Nevertheless, because 
of the various non-climate policy objectives that can be 
achieved with the revenue from a carbon price, economists 
have found that at least some of the potential adverse 
economic consequences for specific sectors, regions, 
or groups can be offset. In fact, some economists have 
found that a properly designed carbon price can achieve 
net economic benefits, even before consideration of the 
climate benefits, which economists refer to as a “double 
dividend.”7 
The economic impacts of a carbon price (in terms of 
economic growth, employment, etc.) are highly contingent 
on how the revenue is spent. Economists have found that 
maximizing economic growth requires using the revenue 
to remove pre-existing “distortions” in the economy that 
serve to hinder growth.8 For example, economic stud-
ies have shown that lower income tax rates (corporate 
and personal) would cause individuals to work more and 
corporations to create more jobs. Revenue can also be 
used to achieve many other objectives, such as investing in 
technologies that spur low carbon innovation and climate 
change adaptation, or providing transitional assistance to 
sectors, regions, and individuals that are most vulnerable 
to the higher prices and lower demand for carbon- 
intensive goods.
Recent studies have shown that neither the distributional 
consequences,9 the regional disparities,10 nor the effects 
on the competitiveness of U.S. industry11 are as large as 
some have feared. Still, using a portion of the revenues to 
address either the actual or perceived “losers” from a car-
bon price may increase the fairness and political viability 
of the policy. 
Next Steps
While we can’t predict what the future may hold, con-
versations with policymakers, stakeholders, and others 
highlight several factors that could combine to increase 
the appeal of carbon pricing policies across the political 
spectrum in coming years. While views differ sharply on 
some of these, factors that might interest people of differ-
ent political views include:
 ▪ Bipartisan support for tax reform;
 ▪ Successful carbon-pricing programs at the state and 
regional levels, including the potential for more pro-
grams spurred by compliance with the new EPA power 
plant standards;
 ▪ Increased awareness of the current and impending 
impacts of climate change;
 ▪ Stated goals for deeper greenhouse-gas emissions 
cuts; and
 ▪ Desire by some for an alternative approach to  
regulating carbon. 
Cap-and-trade programs are already in place in the north-
eastern United States and California. However, following 
the failure of the U.S. Senate to pass climate legislation in 
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2010, talk in Washington D.C. about pricing carbon has 
shifted from cap-and-trade to carbon taxes. These dis-
cussions have involved a wide range of players, but have 
remained quiet and behind the scenes. A key question in 
coming years will be whether, and when, these discus-
sions will again be considered part of mainstream political 
discussion.
We believe that pricing carbon should be a core element of 
the United States’ response to climate change because of 
the massive environmental and economic benefits it can 
offer. Any such policy will result in winners and losers; 
it is therefore critical that any program be designed to 
recognize and address the potential for uneven distribu-
tion of benefits and costs. This paper highlights the major 
tools available for dealing with these concerns. These tools 
also provide the opportunity to satisfy a variety of politi-
cal goals beyond emissions reductions. We hope that this 
working paper—and future issue briefs that will dive more 
deeply into many of the topics discussed here—will play a 
helpful role in the coming national conversation on these 
issues. 
1. INTRODUCTION
Putting a Price on Carbon: A Handbook for U.S. 
Policymakers is offered in the expectation of continued 
debate in the United States over how to address climate 
change. While current policy actions focus on regulatory 
approaches, we believe that putting a price on carbon 
needs to be a core element of the United States climate 
policy in the long term. The Handbook is the first in a 
series of papers that the World Resources Institute will 
produce in coming years with the aim of providing a clear 
and comprehensive understanding of the key issues that 
will need to be addressed if the United States ultimately 
chooses to impose a national price on carbon. The Hand-
book sets out what is already known about the design and 
effects of different approaches to pricing carbon, with the 
main focus being on carbon fees or taxes and cap-and-
trade programs. 
The starting point for most discussions of a carbon price 
is its role in addressing greenhouse gas emissions and 
reducing the future effects of climate change. However, 
in writing the Handbook, we recognize that not all those 
who are or might become interested in carbon pricing 
are motivated by climate science and the need to reduce 
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions in order to avoid the 
worst impacts of climate change. Carbon-pricing pro-
grams can be designed with an eye toward other policy 
goals, such as reforming the tax code to be more efficient. 
Viewed in this way, the potential for emissions reduc-
tion can be seen simply as a side benefit or an insurance 
policy against uncertain but potentially significant climate 
change impacts. 
Because carbon pricing can aim at a variety of policy 
objectives, support for some form of pricing carbon comes 
from divergent points on the political spectrum. Though 
they disagree on the details, supporters include former 
Secretary of State George Schultz,12 former Treasury 
Secretary Henry Paulson,13 and former Republican Con-
gressman Bob Inglis;14 conservative economists such as 
Gregory Mankiw15 and Art Laffer;16 scholars at the Ameri-
can Enterprise Institute,17 Resources for the Future,18 and 
the Brookings Institution;19 and organizations such as 
the Center for American Progress,20 the Citizens’ Climate 
Lobby,21 and the Niskanen Institute.22
The Handbook provides an overview of carbon pricing—
the types of decisions that need to be made in designing 
a program (including the political decisions about the 
use of revenue) and the expected economic impacts. This 
overview provides basic information aimed at improving 
understanding of important trade-offs inherent in pricing 
carbon (for example, between ease of implementation and 
comprehensiveness of coverage), though it is beyond the 
scope of the paper to attempt to resolve them. For those 
new to thinking about pricing carbon, the Handbook can 
serve as a basic primer. For those who have been deeply 
involved in prior legislative debates on climate legislation 
or in research and discussions of cap-and-trade programs 
or carbon fees and taxes, this Handbook provides a broad 
refresher and reference work. We expect that this type of 
reference work will be useful when public debate in the 
United States turns toward whether, how, and when to 
implement a national carbon price. 
In writing this paper, the authors conducted a thor-
ough literature review, selecting a broad array of well-
regarded and highly cited studies that represent a range 
of viewpoints. Our exploration of carbon pricing was 
also informed by a number of conversations—many off 
the record—with carbon-pricing proponents from across 
the political spectrum. Future research by the World 
Resources Institute will explore in more detail some of 
the economic opportunities presented by carbon pricing, 
such as encouraging innovation, and how to evaluate and 
address some of the potential downsides, for example, 
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Box 1  |  What is a “Carbon Price?”
In this Handbook, the term “carbon price” is being applied  
both broadly–to include all greenhouse gases—and narrowly— 
limited to two mechanisms that explicitly result in a price on 
carbon emissions. 
A “carbon price” is sometimes understood to apply to carbon 
dioxide (CO
2
) emissions only. In the context of this paper, we 
will refer generically to greenhouse gases as “carbon” so a car-
bon price can apply beyond CO
2
. See section 3 for a discussion 
of policy design issues related to including greenhouse gases 
other than CO
2
 in a carbon pricing system. 
This Handbook focuses specifically on carbon taxes (or fees) 
and cap-and-trade programs. Both focus on greenhouse gas 
emissions, and result either directly or indirectly in an explicit 
price on carbon emissions. A carbon tax or fee would directly 
establish a price on carbon emissions in dollars per ton of 
emissions. While this price could be applied at the point 
of emissions, many proposals focus on applying the price 
“upstream”—at “chokepoints” where fossil fuels enter the 
broader economy—and are based on the carbon content of the 
fuels. A cap-and-trade program establishes the price indirectly 
by placing a limit on the total quantity of emissions that will 
be allowed. This limit is enforced based on tradable emission 
permits, typically called “allowances,” that any emissions 
source must use to cover its emissions. Like a carbon tax, the 
cap could be applied downstream at the point of emissions, 
upstream where fuels enter the economy, or at points in the 
distribution system in between. The market for these allow-
ances creates the carbon price in a cap-and-trade program. 
Other types of programs can be used to place a price on 
carbon, including programs that are based on emission 
intensity (rather than actual emissions) such as the Specified 
Gas Emitters Regulation (SGER) program in Alberta, Canada.a  
In addition, a program such as a clean energy standard that 
includes trading provisions based on carbon intensity could 
also result in an effective price on carbon. Some discussions 
of carbon pricing also include consideration of fossil fuel and 
other energy subsidies, which can have an important effect on 
the relative cost of different fuels. 
Note:
a. World Bank, State and Trends of Carbon Pricing 2014. 
the potential for regional or income disparities that could 
arise from a carbon price.
This work is intended to seed an ongoing productive 
discussion and debate on the pros and cons of different 
approaches to pricing carbon. While the World Resources 
Institute sees reducing greenhouse gas emissions to 
reduce the impacts of climate change as a critical prior-
ity, the views and input of those interested in exploring a 
carbon price based on other priorities are welcome and 
needed to move the debate forward. We look forward to 
a wide-ranging and productive set of discussions in the 
coming years. 
This paper explores how various design decisions and 
possible uses of carbon revenues can address other policy 
priorities in addition to climate change. The paper begins 
with an overview of carbon pricing (Section 2), followed by 
a brief history of experience with carbon pricing programs 
in the United States and elsewhere (Section 3). Section 
4 then walks through the main decisions that must be 
made to design and implement a carbon-pricing program. 
Section 5 explores the various uses of revenue that have 
been tried or considered as part of different carbon pricing 
programs and proposals, and Section 6 provides a sum-
mary of the literature on the main economic impacts from 
carbon pricing. Conclusions are presented in Section 7. By 
providing clear analysis of what can be achieved through 
different approaches to pricing carbon, this paper hopes 
to guide thinking on how to design a proposal for pricing 
carbon to achieve multiple objectives. 
2. THE BASICS OF PRICING CARBON
2.1. Why Price Carbon?
Pricing carbon can provide an economically efficient 
means of reducing greenhouse gas emissions and mini-
mizing the disruptive risks of climate change. A carbon 
price provides a relatively simple and direct way to ensure 
that more of the costs of climate change are brought into 
the economic calculus behind investments and consump-
tion, including resource and fuel use. It sends a price 
signal that could influence widely dispersed economic 
decisions, help guide future economic growth toward a 
lower carbon economy, and reduce the impacts of climate 
change over time. 
Support for carbon pricing also comes from parties who 
might be motivated by policy priorities other than the 
need for action on GHG emissions, but who see the value 
of an insurance policy against climate risks. Policy priori-
ties that can be addressed through some form of carbon 
pricing include:
 ▪ REDUCING GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS. A carbon price 
can help reduce GHG emissions by internalizing 
the costs of climate change in economic decisions 
throughout the economy. 
8  |  
 ▪ SPURRING INNOVATION IN CLEAN ENERGY. By reflecting 
the cost of carbon in the prices for fuels and goods, a 
carbon price can send an economic signal that helps 
spur investment and innovation in energy sources and 
new technologies that are less carbon intensive. 
 ▪ REDUCING OTHER TAXES. Revenue from pricing carbon 
can be used to reduce other taxes. This can be done 
in a revenue-neutral way that moves from taxing 
things we want more of (for example, employment or 
income) to taxing those we want less of (for example, 
GHG emissions). Options include reductions in pay-
roll, personal income, or corporate income taxes in aid 
of broader tax reform. 
 ▪ RAISING REVENUE FOR OTHER PRIORITIES. Carbon rev-
enues can also help to address other policy priorities. 
For example, revenues could be directed to supporting 
research and development, adapting to climate change 
impacts, investing in infrastructure maintenance and 
improvements, or providing job training or other 
targeted support for industries or regions that are 
disproportionately affected by the carbon price. 
In addition to these priorities, reducing GHG emissions 
can improve energy security, reduce direct energy costs, 
and help reduce other forms of pollution.23 While vari-
ous tools are available to address other forms of pollu-
tion directly, the reductions that result from a carbon 
price have the potential to provide meaningful local and 
regional public health and environmental benefits.24 
2.2. Uses of Revenue
While pricing carbon implies higher prices for certain 
goods, the additional costs to individuals and businesses 
become an additional source of revenue that can either be 
returned to households or spent in other productive ways. 
Among other possibilities, carbon-pricing revenues can 
be used to promote economic growth or employment, to 
advance low-carbon technologies and other activities that 
help combat and prepare for climate change, or to reduce 
any potential adverse effects of the carbon price on specific 
groups. 
The following summarizes some of the specific potential 
uses of carbon-pricing revenues:
 ▪ TAX CUTS. The revenues from carbon pricing can be 
used to fund cuts in income taxes, which increase 
incentives to work and invest, and therefore boost eco-
nomic growth as a result. Taxes on labor and capital 
not only take money away from individuals and busi-
ness, but also decrease incentives to engage in produc-
tive activities such as work and investment. Such taxes 
differ from a carbon price, which reduces the incen-
tive to emit harmful greenhouse gases. The decision 
on which taxes to cut (for example, payroll, personal 
income, or corporate income taxes) may involve trade-
offs between cost-effectiveness and distributional 
concerns.  
 ▪ RETURNING MONEY TO HOUSEHOLDS OR ELECTRICITY 
CONSUMERS. Revenue from carbon pricing could be 
returned to households by sending them “lump sum” 
payments, which could be divided equally or by some 
alternative metric. This “fee-and-dividend” approach 
has gained popularity largely because of its perceived 
fairness and simplicity. Households could be provided 
with tax refunds or sent quarterly or annual checks. 
This approach could also ensure that low-income 
households receive as much in income as they spend 
on the tax. However, such payments are unlikely to 
boost economic growth as much as cutting tax rates, 
because they do not enhance incentives to work or 
invest.
 ▪ DEFICIT REDUCTION. Large national deficits can slow 
economic growth by increasing interest rates, reduc-
ing (or “crowding out”) private sector investments, 
and increasing future tax burdens because of the 
need to pay off the principal or interest on the debt. 
Carbon-pricing revenues could be used to pay down 
the debt and therefore avoid such adverse economic 
effects. Just as reducing current tax rates can increase 
incentives to work and invest, reducing future tax 
rates through deficit reduction could have similar pro-
growth effects. 
 ▪ ENCOURAGING INNOVATION IN LOW-CARBON TECHNOLO-
GIES. While a carbon price can help stimulate innova-
tion in low-carbon technologies (for example, energy 
efficiency or renewable fuels), additional support for 
innovation might be needed to mitigate the effects 
of climate change. Moreover, to the extent that the 
private sector “underinvests” in research and develop-
ment because it cannot capture the public benefits of 
R&D, further government support might be required 
to promote the development of breakthrough tech-
nologies. Carbon-pricing revenues could be a source of 
such funding.   
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Box 2  |  How a Carbon Price Works
The impacts of climate change resulting 
from greenhouse gas emissions impose 
costs on society as a whole. Pricing 
carbon shifts these costs away from the 
broader society to those responsible for the 
emissions, while providing an incentive to 
reduce emissions. 
Putting a price on carbon across the 
economy will increase the prices of goods 
and services in proportion to their carbon 
content, and so in proportion to their effect 
on climate change. The higher prices for 
carbon-intensive goods and services will 
encourage businesses and consumers to 
look for alternatives that meet their needs 
but have lower carbon-emission footprints.  
As a simplified illustration of this type of 
shift, Figure 1 shows the impact of a carbon 
tax of $25 per ton of CO
2
 on the levelized 
cost of electricity (LCOE). LCOE is a 
standard measure for comparing the lifetime 
costs of building and operating different 
electricity generation options, though it 
does not reflect the dynamics of wholesale 
electricity markets that drive electricity rates. 
The carbon tax reflects the relative impact 
of each fuel on CO
2
 emissions, so the tax 
has a larger effect on carbon-intensive coal 
(the fuel that creates the highest carbon 
emissions per unit of energy when burned) 
than on less carbon-intensive natural gas, 
and no effect on non-carbon nuclear and 
renewable sources. The increased fuel 
prices—which now reflect the adverse 
effects of climate change—would then be 
passed on in full or in part in any products 
for which the fuels are an input.
These shifts increase the competitiveness of 
less carbon-intensive sources (see Figure 
1). In addition, less efficient generation 
methods (such as the natural gas turbine) 
see a greater price increase than more 
efficient options (such as natural gas 
combined cycle). 
FIGURE 1  |   EFFECT OF CARBON TAX ON AVERAGE COST OF NEW U.S. ELECTRICITY GENERATION  
FOR PLANTS ENTERING SERVICE IN 2019 (2012 $/MWH)
Sources: “Levelized Cost and Levelized Avoided Cost of New Generation Resources in the Annual Energy Outlook 2014,” U.S. Energy Information Administration, April 
17, 2014, http://www.eia.gov/forecasts/aeo/electricity_generation.cfm. The tax increment is based on heat rates from EIA (“Table 8.2. Average Tested Heat Rates by Prime 
Mover and Energy Source, 2007-2013,” U.S. Energy Information Administration, accessed April 13, 2015, http://www.eia.gov/electricity/annual/html/epa_08_02.html) 
and the emissions per Btu from EIA (“How Much Carbon Dioxide is Produced When Different Fuels Are Burned?,” U.S. Energy Information Administration, accessed April 
13, 2015, http://www.eia.gov/tools/faqs/faq.cfm?id=73&t=11). 
Note: Levelized cost of electricity data in the figure are based on U.S. average levelized costs for plants entering service in 2019 from the 2014 Annual Energy Outlook. 
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 ▪ CLIMATE CHANGE ADAPTATION. While carbon pricing 
can help to mitigate the adverse effects of climate 
change, some impacts—according to the IPCC—are 
now unavoidable. For that reason, some proponents 
of carbon pricing support the use of revenues to invest 
in infrastructure that helps communities adapt to the 
impacts of climate change. Such investments could in-
clude increasing the resiliency of water, transport, and 
energy systems, as well as other infrastructure that is 
vulnerable to extreme weather, sea-level rise, and the 
other effects of a changing climate. 
 ▪ TRANSITIONAL ASSISTANCE FOR AFFECTED SECTORS, 
INDIVIDUALS, AND REGIONS. By inducing changes in 
behavior and purchasing patterns, pricing carbon is 
likely to benefit certain industries and regions more 
than others. A portion of the revenues is often used to 
assist those who are likely to be adversely affected by a 
carbon price. Job training can be provided to workers 
in industries that experience job losses (for example, 
coal mining), and revenues can be disproportionately 
allocated to households and business in regions of the 
country that are most dependent on the production or 
consumption of fossil fuels. Revenues can also be used 
to provide assistance to industries that face increased 
competition from competitors in foreign countries 
without (or with lower) carbon prices.
CARBON TAX CAP-AND-TRADE PROGRAM
What is the scope? Both involve similar decisions regarding the choice of gases to regulate, which sectors to regulate, whether to al-
low relatively small emitters to remain unregulated, and where the regulation occurs (upstream, downstream, etc.). 
Such decisions often involve trade-offs between emissions reductions and feasibility and administrative burdens 
How is a carbon price 
established?
The price is the tax level The price is the market price of emissions allowances (which 
can be estimated via modeling)
What emissions reductions 
can be achieved?
Depends on the response to the change in 
prices (which can be estimated via modeling) 
Maximum emissions established by setting the trajectory of 
emissions caps
Table 1  |   Important Design Features of a Carbon Tax Versus a Cap-and-Trade Program
Many other options are available. While many of those 
who support pricing carbon are champions of particular 
uses of carbon-pricing revenues, many carbon-pricing 
policies and proposals reflect a mix of approaches. 
2.3. The Basics of Cap-and-Trade and  
Carbon-Tax Programs
Carbon taxes and cap-and-trade programs require a num-
ber of similar decisions to be made in the design process. 
These decisions often involve trade-offs: increasing the 
scope of a program beyond a certain level usually implies 
increasing the burden of administering it; programs with 
more stringent emissions targets will cause larger impacts 
on the economy; implementing mechanisms to “smooth” 
these economic impacts will generally increase either 
compliance costs or emissions. 
A carbon tax is in some ways simpler than a cap-and-trade 
program, especially for the companies that would have to 
operate under the system. An emissions cap can ensure 
that emissions targets are met, while a carbon tax can 
ensure a stable trajectory of prices. Table 1 provides an 
overview of the main similarities and differences between 
the two systems,25 while Section 4 provides a short primer 
on designing a carbon-price system. 
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CARBON TAX CAP-AND-TRADE PROGRAM
How do regulated entities 
comply?
Must report emissions (or a proxy for emis-
sions such as fuel quantities) and pay the tax 
based on those emissions
 ▪ Must report emissions (or a proxy) and surrender allowances 
based on those emissions
 ▪ Obtain allowances by direct allocation, through purchase at 
auction, or in the secondary market 
 ▪ Participate in secondary market as buyer and/or seller of 
allowances
 ▪ Bank allowances for future use or borrow for current use (if 
permitted under the regulation) 
How much will it cost 
regulated entities to 
comply?
Future compliance costs based on emissions 
and established tax rates 
 ▪ Future compliance costs based on emissions and estimated 
allowances prices
 ▪ Costs also depend on the degree to which allowances are 
allocated at no charge, versus bought at auction or on the 
secondary market
Can offsets lower 
compliance costs?
In theory, either policy could allow regulated entities to purchase emissions offsets (that is, verified emissions 
reductions from non-covered sources) in lieu of direct compliance, which will lower compliance costs. Offsets are 
more commonly seen as part of cap-and-trade programs 
Where will regulated 
entities reduce their 
emissions?
Where the cost of emissions reductions is 
less than the cost of paying the tax, taking into 
account the trajectory of future taxes
Where the cost of emissions reductions is less than the cost 
of buying (or the opportunity cost of not selling) allowances, 
taking into account the trajectory of expected future allowance 
prices
What is the role of 
markets, and which market 
protections are needed?
A carbon tax would not create a market that 
needs to be regulated
 
 ▪ A mechanism for auctioning allowances (unless all are  
distributed at no charge)
 ▪ A secondary market with proper oversight and regulation (a 
liquid secondary market that sends a transparent price signal 
to regulated entities is needed for an efficient program)
What happens to the 
revenue?
Both a carbon tax and a cap-and-trade program (assuming some degree of auctioning of permits) will generate 
revenue, and the government can stipulate how the revenue is to be spent (for example, reduced taxes, deficit 
reduction, spending on other programs). While the same alternatives will be available under either policy type, 
revenue amounts are likely to be more predictable under a carbon tax 
How does the 
system interact with 
complementary policies 
(for example, a Renewable 
Portfolio Standard)?
 ▪ Complementary policies can achieve emis-
sions reductions beyond those achieved by 
a carbon tax, for example, if a renewable 
portfolio standard requires more renewable 
power than would be deployed with the 
carbon tax alone
 ▪ Complementary policies may be desirable, 
even within covered sectors, for example, to 
encourage innovation or deployment of new 
technologies in certain sectors 
 ▪ Complementary policies shift the location of emissions in the 
economy, but the cap establishes the maximum overall level of 
emissions for covered sectors
 ▪ Complementary policies may be desirable even within covered 
sectors, for example to encourage innovation or deployment of 
new technologies in certain sectors 
Table 1  |   Important Design Features of a Carbon Tax Versus a Cap-and-Trade Program (continued)
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3. A BRIEF HISTORY OF  
CARBON PRICING 
“Taxing carbon dioxide emissions may be an idea whose 
time is at hand in the United States, now that reducing 
greenhouse gas emissions has become an international 
imperative.” These hopeful—but premature—words 
opened Gus Speth’s foreword to The Right Climate for 
Carbon Taxes,26 published by the World Resources 
Institute in August 1992, in the wake of the climate treaty 
signed by more than 150 nations in Rio de Janeiro that 
April. While the Clinton administration, as part of its first 
budget, proposed a tax on the energy content of fuels that 
would have had similarities to a carbon tax on energy,27 
Figure 2   |   Timeline of Carbon Pricing Programs from Around the World
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that proposal was highly controversial and withdrawn by 
the end of 1993.28 No serious proposals for a carbon tax or 
greenhouse gas cap-and-trade program were put before 
Congress for another ten years, though the 1990s did see 
the successful implementation of the acid rain cap-and-
trade program (see Box 3). In the years since the Rio 
Earth Summit, however, many countries and sub-national 
jurisdictions have instituted carbon taxes or cap-and-trade 
programs. Figure 2 lists the carbon-tax and greenhouse 
gas cap-and-trade programs that since have been insti-
tuted around the world. 
Figure 2   |  Timeline of Carbon Pricing Programs from Around the World (continued)
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Box 3  |  Acid Rain Program: The Origin of Cap and Trade
A cap-and-trade program, limiting total 
emissions and enabling regulated entities to 
buy and sell emissions permits, is among the 
most prominent tools used to price carbon. 
The first major cap-and-trade system was the 
Acid Rain Program, passed by Congress in 
1990 to reduce acid rain by regulating sulfur 
dioxide (SO
2
) emissions from power plants. 
The majority of previous environmental 
regulations were “command-and-control,” 
in that they designated emissions rates or 
equipment standards for regulated entities. In 
fact, many environmentalists were hostile to 
the concept of allowing polluters to pay for 
the right to pollute.
The cap-and-trade system at the heart of the 
Acid Rain Program arose from collaboration 
between the Environmental Defense Fund 
(EDF) and the Administration of George H.W. 
Bush.a Regulated power plants were allocated 
a fixed number of tradable allowances and 
had to surrender one allowance per ton of 
SO
2
 emitted (and were heavily penalized if 
they did not). Power plants could buy allow-
ances, sell allowances, or “bank” allowances 
for use in future years, but could not borrow 
allowances from future years’ allocations. 
The emissions cap declined over time toward 
a long-term national goal of 7.6 million tons 
of SO
2
 emissions, which was achieved three 
years ahead of schedule in 2007. 
The great advantage of a cap-and-trade 
system is that it facilitates cost-effective 
emissions reductions. In theory, the plants 
with relatively low-cost opportunities to 
reduce emissions will do so and sell their 
unneeded permits (for a profit) to plants with 
higher cost opportunities, which will then 
avoid expensive emissions reductions. The 
Acid Rain Program was the first major test 
of this theory, and it was highly successful. 
The best estimates of actual program costs 
($1.17 to $2 billion annually) were less than 
the projected costs of command and-control 
alternatives ($3.4 billion to $11.5 billion) and 
also less than EPA’s initial projection for the 
Acid Rain Program ($1.9 to $5.5 billion).b 
Still, some people have argued that costs 
could have been even lower, were it not for 
informational barriers and other state and 
federal regulations that constrained power 
plants’ abilities to select the low-cost abate-
ment opportunities.c  
Overall, the Acid Rain Program is widely 
seen as a success at many levels. Not only 
did it provide large environmental benefits 
at a relatively low cost,d it also paved the 
way for future cap-and-trade systems that 
have focused on carbon emissions. In 2005, 
the European Union’s Emissions Trading 
Scheme became the first major cap-and-trade 
program for greenhouse gas emissions, and 
greenhouse gas cap-and-trade systems have 
since been established in the northeastern 
United States (the RGGI program) and in 
California. 
3.1. Carbon Pricing in the United States  
and Canada
Starting with the Climate Stewardship Act, introduced by 
Senators John McCain and Joseph Lieberman in 2003, 
Congress has seen numerous proposals to cap or tax 
carbon emissions, many of them with bipartisan sponsor-
ship and support.29 The 111th Congress (2009 and 2010) 
was the high-water mark for these proposals, with the 
passage in the House of Representatives of the American 
Clean Energy and Security Act (ACES), often referred to as 
“Waxman-Markey” for the names of its chief sponsors—
then Representatives Henry Waxman and Ed Markey. 
This bill benefited from the many precursors in earlier 
Congresses. While several companion bills were intro-
duced in the Senate during that Congress, none moved to 
a floor vote. 
The debate and compromises that led to the passage 
of ACES in the House provide a useful set of lessons to 
consider in the context of future proposals to price carbon 
at the national level in the United States. Putting in place 
a significant carbon price will result in both winners and 
losers even if the policy provides net benefits overall. For 
the policy to succeed politically and work economically, it 
is critical that the program be designed to recognize and 
address, to the extent needed, the uneven distribution 
of benefits and costs that it could impose. Much of the 
Notes:
a. Conniff, R. August 2009. “The Political History of Cap and Trade.” Smithsonian Magazine.[1-3] See: http://www.smithsonianmag.com/air/the-political-history-of-cap-and-
trade-34711212/?page=2 
b. Siikamäki J., D. Burtraw, J. Maher, and C. Munnings. March, 2012. “The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency’s Acid Rain Program.” Washington, D.C.: Resources for the 
Future. Working Paper.  
c. Schmalensee R. and R. Stavins. August, 2012. “The SO2 Allowance Trading System: The Ironic History of a Grand Policy Experiment.” Cambridge, MA: MIT Center for Energy 
and Environmental Policy Research.  
d. Cost-benefit analyses have shown that the Acid Rain Program contributed benefits roughly 40 times the costs of the program. Interestingly, nearly 95 percent of the estimated 
benefits were related to the health impacts of sulfate particulates, which were not well understood until after the implementation of the program (Schmalensee and Stavins, 2012). 
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Box 4  |  Carbon Pricing and the Clean Power Plan
In June 2014, EPA proposed the Clean Power 
Plan (CPP) to satisfy its obligation to regulate 
greenhouse gas emissions from existing 
power plants.a EPA proposed emissions rate 
standards, but provided states with significant 
flexibility to design their own implementa-
tion plans. After the CPP is finalized by EPA 
in the summer of 2015, states can propose 
implementation plans to EPA by 2016, with 
extensions available to 2017 (for single state 
plans) or 2018 (for multi-state plans).b EPA will 
also issue a final federal plan in 2016 for areas 
that do not submit a state plan. Within one year 
of a state plan being proposed, EPA will either 
approve the plan or institute its own plan before 
the compliance period begins in 2020.  
States are likely to adopt a variety of ap-
proaches to implementing the CPP, including 
pricing carbon. In its proposal, EPA describes 
both “rate-based” and “mass-based” (that 
is, cap-and-trade) performance standards as 
alternative compliance mechanisms. Under 
either approach, a system of tradable emis-
sions allowances could reduce the total costs 
of compliance by incentivizing those with 
high-cost abatement opportunities to purchase 
allowances from those with low-cost abate-
ment opportunities. States and regions with 
pre-existing cap-and-trade programs are likely 
to continue these programs to comply with 
the standard (namely, California, and RGGI in 
nine northeastern states), and additional states 
may take an interest in carbon pricing as an 
implementation option. c    
While not explicitly mentioned by EPA, vari-
ous commentators have called for the use of 
carbon taxes as an additional CPP compliance 
alternative.d By increasing the relative price 
of carbon-intensive electricity generation, a 
carbon tax would lead to an increase in low-
carbon generation or investments in energy 
efficiency, and thus a reduction in overall emis-
sions rates. Using economic modeling (just 
as it would for other compliance strategies), 
a state could show that its planned carbon tax 
would likely achieve the required emissions 
rate standard. Carbon taxes are relatively easy 
to administer because they do not require 
states to allocate emissions allowances, 
conduct auctions, or monitor allowance trad-
ing. Carbon taxes also provide predictable and 
stable price signals to regulated entities, and a 
large source of government revenue that could 
be used to counteract the cost of the tax to 
constituents. Perhaps most importantly, carbon 
taxes (as well as cap-and-trade programs) are 
more cost-effective than emissions rate stan-
dards (even with multi-state trading programs), 
so enabling states to utilize carbon taxes could 
significantly lower the compliance costs of the 
CPP.e 
Notes:
a. “Clean Power Plan Proposed Rule,” U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, accessed April 13, 2015, http://www2.epa.gov/carbon-pollution-standards/clean-power-plan-
proposed-rule. 
b. “Fact Sheet: Clean Power Plan & Carbon Pollution Standards Key Dates,” U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, accessed April 13, 2015, http://www2.epa.gov/carbon-
pollution-standards/fact-sheet-clean-power-plan-carbon-pollution-standards-key-dates. 
c. See “Power Plan Hub,” E&E Publishing, accessed April 13, 2015, http://www.eenews.net/interactive/clean_power_plan. 
d. Wara, M, A. Morris, and M. Darby. October, 2014. “How the EPA Should Modify Its Proposed 111(d) Regulations to Allow States to Comply By Taxing Pollution.” Washington, 
D.C.: Brookings Institution. 
e. Fischer, C. 2001. “Rebating Environmental Policy Revenues: Output-Based Allocations and Tradable Performance Standards,” Washington, D.C.: Resources for the Future. 
Discussion Paper 01-22.
negotiation and compromise that went into the House 
passage of ACES related to finding ways of addressing real 
or perceived costs of the program or finding benefits that 
could bring additional people into the coalition support-
ing the bill. This type of major policy initiative can only be 
put in place in the U.S. political system by finding ways to 
satisfy a wide variety of interests. 
While additional bills have been introduced in Congress 
since then—including the American Opportunity Carbon 
Fee Act, by Senators Whitehouse and Schatz in November 
2014,30  and the Healthy Climate and Family Security Act 
of 2015 by Representative Van Hollen in February 201531—
as of this writing, none have been given serious consider-
ation or a committee hearing.
With little prospect of comprehensive federal action on 
climate change in the mid-2000s, many states began 
working together, including several regional efforts to 
create multi-state cap-and-trade programs. The first of 
these was the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI), 
a multi-state cap-and-trade program for CO2 emissions 
from power plants. The discussions that led to RGGI were 
initiated in 2003, and the program was launched in 2009 
by ten northeastern states (New Jersey withdrew in 2012, 
but New York, Delaware, Maryland, and the New England 
states remain in RGGI). RGGI covers approximately 20 
percent of total GHG emissions in the participating states. 
In February 2013, the RGGI states completed a program 
review that lowered the 2014 emissions cap by 45 percent 
and made additional changes to the cap through 2020. 
16  |  
The revisions recommended through the program review 
are intended to strengthen the program in the years 
ahead.32 
In 2006, California passed the Global Warming Solutions 
Act (AB 32), which required it to reduce emissions to 
1990 levels by 2020. The following year, western states 
(including California) and Canadian provinces created the 
Western Climate Initiative (WCI) and began a regional 
discussion on the design and implementation of a multi-
sector cap-and-trade program. WCI grew to include seven 
states and four Canadian provinces, who jointly agreed on 
design principles for a regional cap-and-trade program.33 
However, California and Quebec are the only jurisdic-
tions that have implemented the program to date. They 
now operate a linked cap-and-trade program that covers 
85 percent of the emissions in each jurisdiction. Ontario 
recently announced its intent to establish a cap-and-trade 
program and link it with California and Quebec as part of 
the WCI.34 British Columbia (BC) remains a member of 
WCI but does not have a firm plan for joining the linked 
cap-and-trade program. BC did establish its own econ-
omy-wide carbon tax in 2008 that is currently set at C$30 
per ton of CO2 across sectors representing 70 percent of 
total GHG emissions in the province. 
Similar discussions among states and provinces in the 
Midwest to form a regional cap-and-trade program were 
initiated in 2007, but did not progress far and were sus-
pended in 2010. (See Box 4 for discussion of the potential 
for carbon pricing as a state implementation measure 
under EPA’s Clean Power Plan, which is establishing 
carbon dioxide standards for existing power plants.) 
Since the failure of the Senate to pass climate legislation 
in 2010, talk in Washington about pricing carbon has 
shifted from cap-and-trade—now considered a politi-
cal non-starter–to carbon taxes. These discussions have 
involved a wide range of players, but have remained quiet 
and behind the scenes. A key question in coming years 
will be whether, and when, these discussions will again be 
considered part of mainstream political discussion. 
3.2. Carbon Pricing Systems Around the World 
While no national carbon price has been established in the 
United States, almost 40 other countries and over 26 sub-
national jurisdictions have implemented carbon-pricing 
programs. Total GHG emissions in the jurisdictions with 
these programs represent more than 22 percent of global 
GHG emissions, with the programs themselves covering 
approximately 12 percent of global emissions.35 
The longest-running programs are the carbon taxes estab-
lished by Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Sweden in the 
early 1990s. National carbon taxes have also been estab-
lished in recent years in France, Iceland, India, Ireland, 
Japan, Mexico, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom, 
while South Africa and Chile have approved carbon taxes 
that have not yet taken effect. In addition, British Colum-
bia has enacted a carbon tax at the sub-national level. 
The largest greenhouse gas cap-and-trade program is the 
European Union’s Emissions Trading System (or EU ETS), 
initially established in 2005. Other national programs 
are operating in New Zealand, Switzerland, and Kazakh-
stan, and one began operation in the Republic of Korea 
in 2015. Sub-national cap-and-trade programs are also 
operating, with an electric sector program in nine states 
in the northeastern United States, linked multi-sector 
programs in California and Quebec, and seven municipal 
and provincial pilot programs under way in China. China 
has begun planning36 a national-level emissions-trading 
system that is expected to be phased in starting in 2016.37 
While significant work remains to be completed, once fully 
operational the Chinese program could be the largest GHG 
trading program in the world. 
Figure 3 shows the current and planned carbon tax and 
cap-and-trade programs from around the world, and 
Appendix A provides summary information about those 
programs. Not included in this summary are systems 
based on carbon intensity, such as the program in Alberta, 
Canada, or offset programs such as the Clean Develop-
ment Mechanism (CDM). 
In addition to these government programs, many busi-
nesses in the private sector are already accounting for sub-
stantial future carbon prices in their planning decisions. 
As shown in a recent report by CDP (formerly known 
as the Carbon Disclosure Project), a growing number of 
multi-national corporations representing a diverse set of 
industries and interest have disclosed using an internal 
carbon price, including BP, Duke Energy, Google, Royal 
Dutch Shell, Wal-Mart, Walt Disney, and Wells Fargo,  
among many others.38  
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4. KEY DESIGN FEATURES
Establishing a carbon-pricing program requires many 
design decisions, including which gases and sectors are 
covered, which entities within the relevant sectors are 
required to comply, and the overall stringency of the 
program. While these elements are described separately 
below, design decisions require consideration of the inter-
actions among these elements. 
The policymakers involved with these decisions will also 
need to balance various criteria that can sometimes con-
flict. These range from comprehensive coverage of emis-
sions, administrative ease in implementation, minimizing 
the economic costs and maximizing benefits, addressing 
differing impacts across population groups and regions, 
and achieving other goals, possibly unrelated to climate. 
This section highlights some of the main choices facing 
policymakers who are considering either a carbon tax 
or a cap-and-trade program. Two of the most critical 
choices are the scope of the program and setting the price 
or cap levels. This section also discusses the importance 
of reporting and verification, and concludes with an 
examination of the possible interaction between a carbon-
pricing program and complementary policies. 
4.1. Scope 
Scope refers to the share of total greenhouse gas emissions 
covered by the program. One element of scope involves 
the greenhouse gases to be included—just CO2, or other 
gases such as methane and hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs) as 
well? The second element is which sectors of the economy 
are covered. Several existing programs only cover one sec-
tor, such as the RGGI program in the northeastern United 
States that only includes electricity generation, while oth-
ers are multi-sector, such as California and the EU ETS. 
The third element is the point of regulation—where and 
how emissions from different sectors are covered. This 
might be “upstream,” using fuels as a proxy for the emis-
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sions that result from fuel combustion, “downstream” at 
point sources of emissions, or somewhere in between.  The 
final element is whether and how to address imports and 
exports in the program. 
For any carbon-pricing program, the broader the scope, 
the greater the emission reductions that will be expected 
from a given carbon price, since more emissions will be 
covered. A broader scope for a cap-and-trade program 
also means that a greater variety of sources will fall under 
the cap, leading to lower overall compliance costs because 
there will be more low-cost emission reduction opportuni-
ties covered by the program. 
4.1.1. Which Gases to Include
Decisions over which greenhouse gases to include in a 
carbon pricing program involve trade-offs between the 
comprehensiveness of the program (that is, the fraction of 
total GHGs covered) and the ease of implementation (the 
ability to quantify the emissions being taxed or capped 
through direct measurement or accurate estimation). For 
each gas, two key factors to consider are (1) the contribu-
tion of the gas to total greenhouse gas emissions; and (2) 
how difficult it would be to measure and regulate the gas.  
CO2 is the most important greenhouse gas (GHG), repre-
senting over 70 percent of total GHG emissions globally 
and over 80 percent in the United States.39 Other key 
greenhouse gases include methane, nitrous oxide, hydro-
fluorocarbons, perfluorocarbons, sulfur hexafluoride, and 
nitrogen trifluoride. Because CO2 is the primary GHG, 
some carbon-pricing systems focus only on this gas. 
Many of the most important sources of CO2, especially 
those based on fossil fuel combustion, are also generally 
easy to measure or estimate, making them well suited for 
inclusion in a carbon pricing system. As seen in Figure 4, 
a program that included only energy-related CO2 would 
have covered 77 percent of total U.S. emissions in 2012. 
Other gases can be included in the system, allowing 
coverage of a larger portion of an economy’s GHG emis-
sions. Including these gases requires careful consideration 
of their relative contributions to climate change. These 
contributions are typically based on the “global warming 
potential” (GWP), which compares gases in terms of CO2-
equivalent (CO2e) units.40 These estimates can be made 
based on considerations of the heat-trapping properties of 
the gases and the time the gas remains in the atmosphere. 
GWPs have been regularly updated in recent decades, 
which can complicate the design of a pricing program. 
The ease of implementing the program is in large part 
contingent upon the extent to which the emissions can 
be readily quantified or accurately estimated. In some 
cases, proxy measures, such as the carbon content of fossil 
fuels, provide a solid basis for quantifying the ultimate 
CO2 emissions. On the other hand, methane and N2O are 
second and third in terms of greenhouse gases emissions 
in the United States, but quantifying or accurately estimat-
ing methane and N2O emissions from agricultural sources 
is difficult, so those sources are less likely to be included in 
a carbon-pricing program. 
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Figure 4  |   Greenhouse Gas Emissions by Gas in the 
United States, 2012
Source: Inventory of U.S. Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Sinks: 1990–2012.  
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, April 2014. Accessible at:   
http://epa.gov/climatechange/ghgemissions/usinventoryreport.html
Figure 5  |   Greenhouse Gas Emissions by Sector in the 
United States, 2012
Source: Inventory of U.S. Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Sinks: 1990–2012.  
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, April 2014. Accessible at:   
http://epa.gov/climatechange/ghgemissions/usinventoryreport.html
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For each gas, policymakers must determine whether the 
benefits of the incremental emissions reductions are worth 
the difficulties associated with including the gas in the 
program. 
4.1.2. Choice of Sectors
A key determinant of the portion of an economy’s green-
house gases that is covered by a carbon-pricing system is 
the choice of economic sectors to be included. One trade-
off is between the ability to quantify emissions—whether 
directly or through proxy measures such as the carbon 
content of fossil fuels—and comprehensiveness. For 
example, the electricity-generating sector already reports 
its GHG emissions.41 As shown in Figure 5, the electric sec-
tor in the United States is responsible for about one third 
of total GHG emissions.42 Limiting a system to this sector 
would miss a significant portion of overall emissions. An 
alternative approach, included in many proposals, is to 
limit the program’s scope to energy-related CO2 emissions, 
which can readily be covered through assigning responsi-
bility for emissions to the point in the supply chain where 
the fuels that will result in the emissions first enter the 
economy. 
There will be different advantages and disadvantages to 
inclusion of other sectors in a carbon-pricing system, and 
political considerations will also come into play in decid-
ing which sectors to include. A carbon-pricing program 
could also begin with a limited scope and expand to 
include a more comprehensive set of sectors or gases after 
the program is initially established. Table 2 summarizes 
the key aspects of different sectors that affect their inclu-
sion in a carbon-pricing system. 
Transportation 28%
Industry 20%
Commercial & Residential 10%
Agriculture 10%
Electricity 32%
Table 2  |  Characteristics Relevant for Decisions on Inclusion in a Carbon Price System
SECTOR
Energy CO2  ▪ Readily addressed based on carbon content of fuels and applying the program upstream, where fuels enter the economy
 ▪ Would not require direct emissions reporting from individual sources in different sectors
 ▪ Would cover 78 percent of total emissions in the United States
Electricity 
Generation
 ▪ Easily identified emission sources that are already subject to environmental regulations and GHG reporting
Industry  ▪ Many emission sources are large facilities that already report GHG combustion and process emissions
 ▪ Numerous smaller industrial sources may be difficult to track and monitor, so might be better addressed through more 
upstream approaches
Transportation  ▪ Significant emissions from many small and difficult-to-measure sources so program might be better directed upstream 
where transportation fuels are produced or distributed
Residential/ 
commercial
 ▪ Significant emissions from many small and difficult-to-measure sources so program might be better directed upstream 
where relevant fuels are produced or distributed (or through complementary policies)
Forestry/ 
agriculture
 ▪ Significant source of emissions and potential source of sequestration 
 ▪ Many emission sources and carbon sinks are dispersed and difficult to monitor, so proxy measures might be needed to 
estimate net emissions 
Non-CO2 gases  ▪ Some non-CO2 GHGs are significant source of emissions in some industries
 ▪ Many emissions result from a large number of sources that may be difficult to monitor, so might be better directed up-
stream (that is, where the gas first enters the economy)
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4.1.3. Point of Regulation
Different approaches can be taken to allocating respon-
sibility for paying the tax or surrendering allowances. 
At one end of the spectrum is an upstream approach in 
which responsibility for the emissions is applied when the 
materials that will result in the emissions first enter the 
economy. In the case of energy-related CO2 emissions, this 
means that responsibility is applied to energy producers: 
the entities that mine coal, produce gas and oil, or import 
fuels. CO2 emissions from each ton of coal, barrel of oil, or 
cubic foot of natural gas can be readily estimated because 
one molecule of CO2 results from every atom of carbon in 
the fuel (generally speaking). The cost added to the fossil 
fuel will generally be passed along to the end users of 
the energy and, for manufacturers, will be incorporated 
into production costs. This approach allows a very large 
fraction of energy-related CO2 emissions to be covered in 
a system that requires relatively few responsible parties to 
play a direct role. 
At the other end of the spectrum, a downstream approach 
would apply responsibility at the point where the emis-
sions actually occur. Large point sources like power 
plants and steel manufacturing plants are major emit-
ters of CO2 because they burn large quantities of fossil 
fuels. Tapping them as the point of regulation captures 
the major emitters who are responsible for a very large 
fraction of  energy-related CO2 emissions. This approach 
may provide a useful point of regulation for a program 
like RGGI, which is limited to the electricity-generating 
sector. However, following this path is more difficult for 
distributed sources such as residential and commercial 
building heating systems or cars and trucks. In these 
cases, an intermediate point may be more appropriate. 
For example, emissions from combustion of natural gas in 
household and small-scale commercial use can be cap-
tured by making gas utilities responsible for the emissions 
embedded in their product. A system can include a mix of 
these approaches. For example, California’s cap-and-trade 
program initially covered large industrial sources directly 
(downstream), but has since expanded to include distrib-
uted use of natural gas by homes and smaller businesses 
through the utility distribution companies (midstream).
In a downstream program, it might be simpler to estab-
lish an emissions threshold below which sources are not 
included. Policymakers must decide whether the expected 
emissions reductions from sources with emissions below 
the threshold are sufficient to make the costs associated 
with regulating these smaller sources worthwhile. 
The decisions of whether and how to set thresholds are 
generally based on what proportion of total emissions 
are associated with “large” emitters, and these decisions 
will differ by sector. In many sectors, such as electricity 
generation or cement manufacturing, the most significant 
emitters will also be responsible for the great majority of 
emissions and will already be reporting emissions. In this 
case, including all facilities in a carbon-pricing program 
would greatly increase the number of facilities covered—
including many that are below emission thresholds for 
reporting requirements—without significantly increasing 
the amount of emissions included in the program. Other 
industries, like food processing or pulp and paper, have 
more small- and medium-sized facilities and companies, 
indicating that lower emissions thresholds for inclusion 
(or no thresholds) might be appropriate. 
Regulating fuels as they enter the economy is one way to 
address emissions from smaller sources without attempt-
ing to regulate them directly. However, even an upstream 
system will require consideration of whether and how to 
apply thresholds.
4.1.4. Imports and Exports
A pricing program might also attempt to address emis-
sions associated with imports from countries that do not 
have a carbon price in place (or have a lower carbon price) 
to avoid putting U.S. producers and manufacturers at an 
unfair disadvantage. The benefits and controversy sur-
rounding such “border tax adjustments” are discussed in 
more detail in Section 6.2.3. 
For energy imports in an upstream carbon price system, 
applying a border tax adjustment is relatively straightfor-
ward, because the carbon price can be applied at the point 
of import and a credit can be applied at the point of export 
of domestically produced energy. 
Addressing emissions associated with imported goods 
outside the energy sector is more complicated. “Embed-
ded emissions,” that is, the emissions generated during 
manufacture and transport, are a significant concern for 
energy-intensive, trade-exposed industries. The industries 
that might potentially be affected are an important part 
of the U.S. manufacturing base, but represent a relatively 
small portion of the U.S. economy.43 See Section 6.2.3 for 
a discussion of the impact of carbon pricing on industrial 
competitiveness. 
WORKING PAPER  |  April 2015  |  21
Putting a Price on Carbon: A Handbook for U.S. Policymakers
As more carbon-pricing programs are established around 
the world, this issue may recede in importance, but for 
now it remains one of the potential political concerns that 
must be understood when designing any carbon-pricing 
program in the United States. 
4.2. Setting the Price or Cap
Different approaches can be taken to setting the level of a 
carbon tax or emissions cap. From a climate perspective, 
one can start from either consideration of emission targets 
or estimates of the damages caused by GHG emissions. 
For those whose primary interests lie in non-climate 
policy priorities, such as tax reform, setting the price 
might have more to do with the amount of revenue needed 
to serve those priorities. In designing a pricing program, 
it is also important to recognize that the price or cap is 
normally not going to be a single number but rather a 
trajectory—an increasing tax rate or declining cap over a 
period of years or decades. In any case, setting the level 
of the tax or cap will likely require balancing a variety of 
political and economic considerations, such as attempting 
to ease the economic transition by starting at a relatively 
low price but allowing the price to increase over time to 
ensure significant emission reductions.
The United States has put forward emissions targets for 
2020 (17 percent reduction from 2005 levels) and 2025 
(26 to 28 percent reductions from 2005). These goals 
could provide the basis for the trajectory of emissions 
caps, and modeling could be used to estimate the result-
ing carbon price or to suggest an appropriate carbon tax 
trajectory. Longer-term targets, for example for 2030 or 
2050, could be used as well. However, translating between 
carbon prices and emissions levels over the long term—
whether determining the emissions effects over time of 
a given carbon-tax system or the prices that would result 
from a given carbon cap—is complicated by the uncer-
tainties involved in modeling long-term developments in 
economic and energy systems. (See text box “The Limits of 
Economic Modeling” in Section 6.)
In theory, setting a carbon price based on damages caused 
by climate change aims to ensure that the full costs of 
climate change are incorporated into the prices of carbon-
intensive goods and services. The United States and other 
countries have estimated the “social cost of carbon” (SCC) 
to gain insight into a key economic question–what dam-
age does an incremental ton of emissions create?44 The 
SCC attempts to identify and quantify the major impacts 
of climate change from around the globe and for centuries 
into the future. These impacts, which affect public health, 
the environment, and infrastructure, must be translated 
into monetary terms and discounted to present values 
in order to determine the “cost” of the incremental ton 
of emissions in today’s dollars. In the United States, the 
Office of Management and Budget has directed agencies 
to use a range of SCC estimates in quantifying the benefits 
of reducing carbon emissions as part of their regulatory 
impact analyses. However, the resulting SCC estimates are 
highly imprecise, due to the major uncertainties surround-
ing the impact estimates, and also incomplete, because 
sufficient information to translate certain damages into 
monetary values is lacking.45 
For policymakers who are not motivated primarily by the 
need to address climate change, the amount of revenue 
needed for particular policy purposes, such as paying for 
reductions in payroll or corporate tax rates or provid-
ing funding for infrastructure, provides an alternative 
approach for determining the level of the carbon price. 
Getting the level of the price and its trajectory over time 
right would still require modeling; while the price could be 
set with certainty for a carbon tax, the effect of the price 
on future emissions, and thus on future revenues, would 
need to be modeled. In addition, if the emissions levels 
were to fall more quickly than the price were to rise over 
time, the result would be declining revenues. Net govern-
ment revenue would also be affected in either type of 
program by the extent to which tax payments or allowance 
purchases were deductible business expenses. 
4.2.1. Changes in the Carbon Price over Time 
Typically, the program will include an increasing price or 
declining cap that changes over time. With a price that 
starts at a relatively low level and increases in a predict-
able way over time, the immediate economic effects of the 
policy on existing activities are muted, because industries 
and consumers can adjust gradually to the carbon price. 
The signal sent throughout the economy—continued 
emissions will be increasingly costly in future years—is 
clear and can shift investment and other economic activity 
that need to take into account future costs and revenue 
streams. For example, when British Columbia introduced 
its carbon tax, it established the tax at C$10 per ton CO2e 
for the first year (2008), increasing at C$5 per year until 
it reached C$30 in 2012.46 A decreasing cap works in the 
same way, though with uncertainty over the future prices 
that companies and consumers will face. 
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In establishing a carbon-price trajectory, policymakers 
will need to balance the competing objectives of maximiz-
ing emissions reductions (accomplished with a faster rise 
in prices) and tempering the near-term economic effects 
of the program (accomplished with a more gradually 
increasing price). 
In addition, emission reductions may prove either more 
or less expensive than anticipated, with the result that 
the economic and environmental outcomes differ from 
predictions. For example, in the case of both the EU ETS 
(after its initial phase) and RGGI, shifting levels of eco-
nomic activity and (in the case of RGGI) reduced natural 
gas prices meant that the emission levels have been below 
the caps. The EU ETS and RGGI have since moved either 
to lower their caps in future phases or delay the auction-
ing of allowances to address the unanticipated low level of 
emissions.47 Conversely, if emission reductions are more 
expensive or otherwise more difficult to achieve, a tax 
might result in fewer emission reductions than expected or 
a cap-and-trade program might experience higher allow-
ance prices. Unanticipated circumstances can also lead to 
very high prices in a cap-and-trade program or minimal 
emission reductions resulting from a carbon tax.48 
Anticipating such circumstances argues for including an 
adjustment mechanism in the original program design to 
minimize the potential for disruptive, unplanned changes 
or a cost-containment mechanism (see below). In terms 
of an adjustment mechanism, for example, the program 
rules might call for monitoring progress and determining 
whether the price/cap trajectory needs to be adjusted at 
established points along the way. 
4.2.2. Cost-Containment Mechanisms
Price stability provides an important measure of con-
fidence for those investing in emission reductions and 
clean technology. In the case of a carbon tax, this is an 
inherent aspect of the program—the design establishes the 
price of carbon emissions over time. Cost-containment 
mechanisms can address concerns regarding severe price 
fluctuations in a cap-and-trade program. If prices rise too 
high or too quickly, they could result in significant eco-
nomic harm; if they drop too low, they will not provide the 
desired price signal for low-carbon investment. As with 
most program design choices, the decisions as to whether 
to include cost containment mechanisms typically involve 
trade-offs, which are discussed below for offsets and price 
ceilings/floor. 
OFFSETS 
Offsets are documented emissions reductions that occur 
outside the regulated sectors, and can be used by regu-
lated entities in lieu of reducing emissions covered by the 
system. Offsets can reduce program costs (because a regu-
lated entity will utilize offsets when they are less expensive 
than covered emissions reductions) while achieving the 
same level of emissions reductions. 
Offsets can also provide a way to bring into the program 
sources that are difficult to address directly. For example, 
overall emissions from agricultural are often difficult to 
quantify, but it might be easier to quantify (and verify) 
the emissions reductions from specific actions, such 
as improved manure management. Offsets have been 
included in most cap-and-trade programs, but they 
have often been controversial because of concerns about 
whether the offsets really represent emissions reduc-
tions that would not have happened anyway.49 Accurately 
measuring, reporting, and ensuring the quality of offsets 
is essential. They must result from actions that would not 
have been taken without the ability to sell the offset cred-
its, and the emissions reductions must be real, permanent, 
quantifiable, and verified.50 The decision as to whether 
to include offsets typically involves weighing the trade-
off between lower compliance costs and the certainty of 
achieving the environmental objectives. Including offsets 
undermines certainty when there are concerns over the 
validity of the associated emissions reductions. 
Offsets are more often associated with cap-and-trade 
programs than with carbon taxes, but they can be incor-
porated into either type of program. Under cap-and-trade, 
the offset credits can be used to cover emissions in the 
same way as allowances. Under a carbon tax, regulated 
entities can be allowed to use offsets to reduce the quan-
tity of emissions (or amount of fuel or other proxy for 
emissions) on which the tax is assessed. In either case, the 
system would need to include rules for establishing defini-
tions of valid offsets and limits, if any, on their use. 
PRICE CEILINGS AND FLOORS
A price ceiling limits how high (or how fast) allowance 
prices can rise, and a price floor limits how low they can 
fall. Used together, they form a price collar. These mecha-
nisms are relevant only for cap-and-trade programs, and 
make those programs more like a carbon tax by increasing 
certainty about future prices. For example, the Califor-
nia cap-and-trade program includes a price floor that is 
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implemented as a minimum price on the auction of its 
allowances. The floor was initially set at $10 per ton of 
CO2e, increasing annually at the rate of inflation plus five 
percent.  
A program might include a ceiling, a floor, or both. The 
purpose of the ceiling is to prevent economic disruption 
from very high carbon prices or from prices that rise too 
quickly. In general, a price ceiling will result in higher 
emissions over time, since the primary response to hitting 
the ceiling is likely to be an increase in the supply of allow-
ances. A price floor can be used to prevent the collapse of 
the carbon price, ensuring that clean energy investments 
will at least be supported by a known minimum carbon 
price. 
The drawback of price ceilings and floors is that they cre-
ate inefficiencies in the markets for emissions allowances. 
Buyers and sellers might both wish to trade at a price 
higher than the ceiling or lower than the floor, but they are 
prohibited from doing so. Policymakers must determine 
whether the benefits noted above are worth the costs of 
these market inefficiencies.  
4.3. Reporting and Verification
A key prerequisite for a successful system is a robust 
reporting and verification system. Such a system needs to 
be appropriate to the point of implementation; it is critical 
to have accurate and verified reporting of the emissions 
tied to the entity in the system that is responsible for 
them. An upstream approach involves reporting the pro-
duction and imports of fossil fuels (often already done for 
other purposes) and translating the fuel report data into 
equivalent emissions. Similarly, downstream or interme-
diate approaches mean that reporting must accurately tie 
the emissions to the responsible entity. 
Because the addition of a carbon price creates direct 
economic consequences, verification of entities’ emission 
reports is essential. Different approaches to verification 
are possible, from independent third party verification to 
self-certification with strong penalties. To provide con-
fidence that those covered by the program are providing 
consistent and accurate information, the reporting must 
be complete, accurate, consistent, transparent, and with-
out material misstatement.51 Piggy-backing on existing 
reporting systems to the fullest extent possible simplifies 
implementation for both business and the government. 
In designing a carbon-pricing program, policymakers 
must determine how to develop a system for reporting 
and verification that is accurate and reliable while also 
minimizing administrative and regulatory burdens to the 
extent possible.
4.4. Complementary Policies
A price on carbon can be a key element of a broader 
climate policy because it provides significant signals 
throughout the economy that encourage a shift to lower 
carbon energy and products. However, additional pro-
grams and policies will likely be needed to help provide 
a cost-effective path to deep greenhouse gas emissions 
reduction in the coming decades. 
4.4.1. Addressing Emissions and Sources  
Outside the Program Scope
A carbon-pricing program is unlikely to address all 
sources of greenhouse gas emissions, because some 
emissions are too dispersed or hard to measure to be 
included in a program without overburdening administra-
tion. To reduce greenhouse gas emissions throughout the 
economy, additional approaches can encourage or require 
emission reductions from sources not covered by the car-
bon price. Such approaches might include offset programs 
allowing crediting of emission reduction activities, direct 
regulation, investments in R&D, or incentive programs. 
4.4.2. Energy Efficiency
Energy efficiency has many well documented market bar-
riers, such as split incentives between building owners and 
tenants, up-front costs, and lack of information, which 
hamper the achievement of the full range of cost-effective 
opportunities.52 Applying a carbon price will strengthen 
the market signals and provide incentives for additional 
energy efficiency, but will not eliminate market barriers. 
For this reason, many programs that currently provide 
incentives to efficiency might still be needed, even with a 
carbon-pricing system in place. Carbon revenues, how-
ever, could provide significant additional funding to help 
support or expand such programs over time; this has been 
the case with the RGGI program. The Analysis Group has 
shown that, in the first three years of RGGI’s operation, 
RGGI added $1.6 billion in net present value to the econo-
mies of the participating states, in large measure thanks to 
spending auction revenues on energy efficiency programs.53 
4.4.3. Regulations and Standards
Market mechanisms such as a carbon tax or cap-and-
trade program are often considered more cost effective 
in achieving emission reductions than more traditional 
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regulations and standards, assuming that relevant mar-
kets (especially for energy efficiency and innovation) are 
functioning close to the competitive ideal.54 For policy-
makers who view a carbon price as a means to other policy 
goals, avoiding these types of regulations and standards 
might be seen as a goal of implementing a carbon price. 
However, in certain circumstances, a carbon price might 
be less effective at reducing greenhouse gas emissions 
than alternative policies; markets are not perfect, and 
in some cases prices will not be effective. For example, 
even a low carbon price applied uniformly across the U.S. 
economy would likely achieve significant power sector 
reductions, where significant low-cost opportunities are 
available, but a higher carbon price would be required to 
have meaningful effects in the transportation sector. The 
relatively low rate of fleet turnover slows the rate at which 
changes in vehicle technology lead to emission reductions, 
and shifting from gasoline and diesel to lower carbon 
fuels will require both vehicle and fueling infrastructure 
changes. Given that vehicle technology, fueling infrastruc-
ture and purchase patterns have little near-term response 
to a carbon price, pairing a carbon price with continued 
strong vehicle and alternative fuel standards is likely 
to prove a more effective approach to achieving deeper 
medium-term emission reductions, with the added benefit 
of reducing reliance on oil imports. 
Similarly, a major near-term response to a carbon price 
in the electricity sector in the United States would likely 
be the increased use of natural gas. This could provide 
significant emission reductions for the next decade, but if 
deeper reductions are desired in the medium to long term, 
a continued shift to use of zero- and near-zero emissions 
sources, for example, renewables, nuclear power, and 
coal plus carbon capture and sequestration, is likely to be 
needed. Continued support through standards and other 
policies for these technologies might be a means to achiev-
ing such medium- to long-term emission reductions.
4.4.4. Investing in Enabling Technologies
Many emission reduction opportunities depend on other 
technologies that are not likely to be stimulated by a car-
bon price because of the same market barriers that ham-
per energy efficiency investments. For example, technical 
upgrades to the national grid would enable an increased 
contribution of power from distributed electricity generat-
ing sources, including renewables. A carbon price by itself 
is unlikely to provide sufficient incentive for investment in 
the grid, because any benefit from increased distributed 
power generation does not tend to accrue to parties invest-
ing in the grid. Public investment in infrastructure and 
enabling technologies might be able to unlock significant 
emission reduction opportunities across the economy. 
4.4.5. Research and Development
Achieving the deep emission reductions needed by mid-
century will require significant technological innovation 
and advancement. Increased support for research and 
development is likely to speed the development and 
deployment of new and improved technologies that may 
significantly reduce the cost of achieving the long-term 
emission goals. See Section 5.3.2, below, for further 
discussion on using revenues from a carbon-pricing 
program to support innovation in emissions-reduction 
technologies. 
5. COMMONLY PROPOSED USES OF 
CARBON PRICING REVENUES
According to the Environmental Protection Agency, U.S. 
greenhouse gas emissions in 2012 were more than 6.5 bil-
lion metric tons of carbon dioxide equivalents.55 A carbon 
tax, or a cap-and-trade program with allowance auctions, 
therefore has the potential to raise well over $100 billion 
per year at a moderate price of about $15 per ton, depend-
ing on its initial level and scope (for reference, in 2013 the 
corporate income tax brought in roughly $273 billion of 
revenue).56 In an economy with a gross domestic product 
of nearly $17 trillion, this is a relatively small but far from 
negligible sum.57 For a Congress looking for new sources 
of revenue to finance tax reform or avoid cutting politically 
popular tax expenditures, a carbon price could receive 
some unlikely support—potentially even from those who 
are not focused on reducing GHG emissions, but who see 
a carbon tax as more palatable than other taxes or as a 
potential substitute for regulations.
How any revenue gets spent will, of course, be decided by 
the legislative process. Yet, because it is one of the most 
critical and politically contentious elements of carbon-
pricing policy design, with implications for individuals, 
companies, and the economy, this paper examines some of 
the most commonly proposed uses of revenue. 
Policymakers have no shortage of competing priorities 
from which to choose, and each presents a wide range of 
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advantages and disadvantages. Many revenue uses could 
potentially provide a “double dividend” of reduced green-
house gas emissions and improved economic efficiency. 
Indeed, previous analysis by WRI and others indicates 
that well-designed policies to combat climate change can 
enhance economic growth.58 
While the prospect of significant new revenue can bring 
many people to the table for a conversation, disagree-
ments over how to slice the pie can make the resulting 
discussions difficult. For example, some proponents59 of 
a carbon tax insist on a revenue-neutral offsetting of the 
carbon tax with an attendant reduction in other taxes, 
while others60 advocate for returning revenues to house-
holds, reducing the deficit, or spending the money on 
other priorities.
Different stakeholders have differing views of revenue 
neutrality. Many conservatives would consider a carbon 
tax to be revenue neutral only if all revenues were used to 
reduce other taxes, with the federal government seeing no 
net increase in tax revenues, and no new spending.61 Pro-
ponents of a fee-and-dividend policy, on the other hand, 
view their approach as revenue neutral as well, in that all 
carbon-tax revenues are returned to households rather 
than used by the government for other purposes.62
In this section, we’ll review many of the most commonly 
suggested uses of revenues from a carbon tax or allowance 
auctions under cap-and-trade, including:
 ▪ Reducing “distortionary” taxes such as payroll, 
corporate and personal income taxes;
 ▪ Reducing government deficits;
 ▪ Investing in job training;
 ▪ Returning the revenue to households or electricity 
consumers;
 ▪  Addressing regional disparities;
 ▪ Investing in economic competitiveness;
 ▪ Investing in technologies that enable communities to 
adapt to climate change; and
 ▪ Investing in clean technology innovation. 
For each alternative, we provide an overview of the 
economic and political strengths and weaknesses, and 
real world examples, where available. We have grouped 
these revenue uses by their primary intended effect but, as 
illustrated in Table 3 below, spending revenue can have a 
wide array of economic impacts.
5.1. Encourage Economic Growth
5.1.1. Reduce Distortionary Taxes
Economists typically single out several categories of taxes 
—such as those on labor, investment, and capital—as being 
“distortionary;” that is, they serve to discourage things like 
work and investment, which are encouraged elsewhere 
in the tax code and by other policies. Using some or all of 
the revenue from a carbon tax to reduce these distortion-
ary taxes, including payroll and corporate and personal 
income taxes, can result in increased economic growth 
and output. 
Economists from across the political spectrum are among 
those most keen to use carbon tax revenue to offset dis-
tortionary taxes elsewhere.63 Doing so, they argue, would 
make the tax code more efficient, and would reduce disin-
centives to work and invest. Among the taxes most cited as 
ripe for reduction are payroll taxes and those on corporate 
income. The former are more regressive than the tax code 
as a whole—in 2014, only the first $117,000 of income was 
subject to Social Security payroll taxes—and they increase 
the cost of labor, discouraging employers from additional 
hiring and reducing the incentive to work. Taxes on corpo-
rate income are passed through to customers, employees, 
or shareholders, and are an inefficient means of taxing any 
of these groups. They can also discourage companies from 
investing and establishing or keeping their operations 
in the United States, which nominally has the highest mar-
ginal corporate income tax rate in the developed world.64 
However, the effective tax rate—what companies actually 
pay—is typically far less than this statutory rate, for a 
variety of reasons.65 Using carbon-tax revenue to reduce 
either, or both, of these taxes can pay dividends through-
out the economy, including greater economic growth and 
increases in overall employment. 
Such a “revenue-neutral tax swap” is among the most 
common policy proposals from advocates of carbon taxes. 
Typically, in these proposals, most or all of the revenue 
from the carbon tax goes toward reducing other taxes, so 
there is no increase or decrease of revenue to the govern-
ment. Generally speaking, most studies on the topic have 
found that, while reducing taxes on either labor or capital 
can offset at least some of the negative effects on economic 
output from a carbon tax, reducing the top tax rate on 
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capital would be most effective at reducing the inefficiency 
caused by the tax system. For example, McKibbin et al. 
(2012) found that implementing a tax on carbon and 
reducing the marginal tax rates on capital would result 
in greater economic growth in the coming decades than 
would be the case in a business-as-usual scenario.66 But 
the authors found that cutting marginal tax rates on labor 
instead would result in a small net negative effect on total 
economic output. And Carbone et al. (2012) found that 
cutting taxes on capital was more beneficial than cutting 
taxes on labor or consumption from an economic growth 
standpoint (though with no provision for issues of distri-
butional equity), and this finding applied to both present 
and future generations.67 
While reducing capital tax rates might be the most effi-
cient use of revenue, studies have found that reducing tax 
rates on labor can offset at least a significant portion, and 
perhaps all, of the potential adverse economic impacts of 
the carbon tax. For example, a 2011 OECD study found 
that when “revenues [from allowance auctions of an 
emissions-trading program] are used to reduce taxation 
on labor, the pace of employment growth would acceler-
ate…without any loss of purchasing power for workers.”68 
According to Lawrence Goulder, an economics professor 
at Stanford University, the greater the inefficiency in the 
current tax system, the more likely it is that using carbon-
tax revenues to cut labor taxes will lead to an increase in 
overall employment and economic growth.69 See Section 
6 for more details on the economic effects of reducing 
distortionary taxes.
5.1.2. Reduce Deficits 
Interest payments on the national debt can potentially 
crowd out other investments, dampening economic 
growth and output. Some economists argue that future 
tax rates will need to increase in order to make interest 
payments and pay down the debt, and that the expectation 
of future tax increases will discourage work and reduce 
savings.70 Some carbon-tax advocates therefore argue that 
policymakers have good incentive to use revenues from 
the tax to reduce annual deficits and pay down the debt, 
leading to long-term economic growth.71 (For more discus-
sion of the economic impacts of using carbon-tax revenue 
to reduce the national debt, see Section 6).
Much like reducing distortionary taxes, proponents of 
using carbon-tax revenue to address the national debt 
are trading one tax for another—in this case, offsetting a 
potential future tax increase, or allowing for a potential 
future tax reduction (government deficits can be rolled 
over forever, so whether to raise taxes to pay down the 
debt can be as much a policy question as an economic 
one). Although the issue of the rising national debt has 
faded somewhat after the deficit peaked in fiscal year 2011, 
many policymakers are still weighing the available options 
for long-term solutions to a potentially destabilizing fiscal 
problem.72
Ireland implemented a carbon tax in 2010, covering most 
of the carbon dioxide emissions from sectors not already 
included in the European Emissions Trading Scheme. 
Following the 2008 fiscal crisis, the decision was made to 
institute a carbon tax in lieu of other austerity measures 
and tax increases, and use much of the revenue to reduce 
annual budget deficits. In the years since its implementa-
tion, the carbon tax has contributed to a dramatic slow-
down in the growth rate of the Irish national debt and has 
led to a reduction in emissions from covered sectors.73, 74 
While the circumstances under which the carbon tax was 
first implemented were extraordinary, this case neverthe-
less illustrates the way in which a carbon tax can help 
address national debt.
5.2. Ease Transition Costs for Individuals,  
Sectors, and Regions 
5.2.1. Invest in Job Training
By inducing changes in behavior and purchasing patterns, 
a carbon price will, over time, benefit some industries 
(renewable energy, energy efficiency, clean vehicles, 
etc.) at the expense of others, especially coal and oil 
production. While such structural shifts in the economy 
may not significantly affect overall employment, and are a 
regular part of growth and economic shifts, policymakers 
may nonetheless decide to enact measures to ensure 
those that are adversely affected by a carbon tax are able 
to transition quickly and find new jobs. Federal support 
for job training programs,75 spending on education, and 
other uses of carbon tax revenues can limit the impact 
of a carbon tax on employment in particular industries, 
or accelerate a transition to clean energy jobs.76 In some 
cases, new initiatives for displaced workers can build upon 
existing federal programs.77
Some studies have found benefits to both short-term and 
long-term job training programs. Low-cost, short-term 
programs—those designed to get a person back to work as 
quickly as possible—have been found to reduce the time 
spent unemployed and increase job stability, and they are 
cost effective in the near term. Participants in long-term 
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training programs, which are aimed at giving workers the 
skills they need to succeed in a new field, benefit from 
even more job stability and higher lifetime earnings.78 On-
the-job training programs have also proven cost effective. 
A study of 16 trades across the Canadian economy found 
that employers received C$1.47 in benefits for every C$1 
invested in apprenticeship programs.79
There are few examples of existing carbon-pricing policies 
that re-invest revenues into job-training programs, but the 
recently enacted carbon tax in Chile may prove instruc-
tive as it is implemented. In September 2014, as part of 
a broader tax reform, Chile enacted a $5-per-ton tax on 
carbon emissions from power plants in order to reduce its 
fossil fuel imports and encourage renewable energy devel-
opment. It has been proposed that, when it goes into effect 
in 2018, most of the revenues from the carbon tax, and 
other tax increases, will go toward education initiatives. 
While this policy will not likely pay immediate economic 
dividends, Chile views it as a long-term investment in the 
economy and a way to reduce economic inequality. It will 
be a case study to follow in the years to come.80
5.2.2. Return Money to Households or Electricity 
Consumers
The notion of sending a quarterly or annual check to 
households to offset the increase in commodity prices 
resulting from a carbon tax—known as “fee-and-divi-
dend”—has grown in popularity in recent years, largely 
because of its perceived fairness and simplicity. By divid-
ing carbon-tax revenues equally amongst all consumers, 
programs ensure that lower income households receive 
as much or more in revenue as they spend on the tax, and 
a sizeable fraction of households would be net winners 
on a monetary basis.81 Unlike proposals to reduce other 
taxes, fee-and-dividend programs do not have to contend 
with the problem of declining carbon-pricing revenues 
that must still fund permanent tax cuts. Also, by giv-
ing revenues to individuals or groups, policymakers can 
potentially increase public support for continued carbon 
pricing and make such a policy more “sticky,” because any 
reduction in price or repeal of the policy would reduce or 
eliminate those dividends.82
However, some commentators do not agree that imple-
mentation would be so straightforward. Many also dis-
agree with the characterization of this as a revenue-neutral 
option. Providing dividend checks would likely involve at 
least a small amount of new spending and growth of gov-
ernment to determine and distribute the dividends. Fur-
Box 5  |  British Columbia’s Carbon Tax—Proving 
  Emissions Reductions and Economic    
   Growth Can Co-Exist
The Canadian province of British Columbia provides a real-
world example of a carbon tax that reduces other taxes and is 
intended to be revenue neutral. British Columbia implemented 
a carbon tax of C$10 per metric ton of CO
2
 equivalent in July 
2008, which increased by C$5 per year to C$30 per metric ton 
in 2012; the tax will remain at C$30 per metric ton through 
2017. The tax was designed to be revenue neutral, as the 
province anticipated using the revenues from the carbon tax to 
reduce a range of personal and business taxes. Those measures 
include providing a tax credit for low-income households, 
reducing the two lowest personal income tax bracket rates 
by five percentage points, and cutting the general and small 
business corporate income tax rates by two percentage points.a 
In its first few years, however, the tax was actually revenue 
negative, in part because the price on carbon reduced demand 
more than anticipated, leading to carbon-tax revenues that 
were lower than the province had projected. British Columbia 
therefore took in less money from its carbon tax than it cut from 
other taxes. 
A 2013 analysis of British Columbia’s carbon tax found that 
it has been successful in reducing greenhouse gas emissions 
without adversely affecting economic growth. In the five years 
following implementation, per capita greenhouse gas emis-
sions fell 18.8 percent relative to the rest of Canada, while 
GDP growth kept pace with the rest of Canada. Moreover, the 
province’s personal income tax rates are now the lowest in the 
country, and its corporate tax rates are among the lowest in 
North America.b British Columbia therefore provides an ex-
ample of one way in which governments can reduce distortion-
ary taxes, address regressivity, and reduce emissions–all while 
ensuring that no income group is made worse off. We should 
note, however, that some observers question British Colum-
bia’s suitability as an example for a carbon tax in the United 
States, especially given the differences in sources of electricity 
generation between the two regions.c  
Notes:
a. British Columbia Ministry of Finance. February, 2012. “Budget and 
Fiscal Plan, 2012/13-2014/15.” Available at http://www.bcbudget.gov.
bc.ca/2012/bfp/2012_Budget_Fiscal_Plan.pdf
b. Elgie, S., and J. McClay. 2013. “BC’s Carbon Tax Shift After Five 
Years: Results.” Sustainable Prosperity. July. Available at: http://www.
sustainableprosperity.ca/dl1026&display
c. See, for example, Marlo Lewis, “Why British Columbia’s Carbon Tax is 
Not Applicable to America,” OnPOINT, September 16, 2014, https://cei.
org/sites/default/files/Marlo%20Lewis%20-%20Why%20British%20
Columbia’s%20Carbon%20Tax%20Is%20Not%20Applicable%20to%20
America_0.pdf. 
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thermore, a policy that provides equal dividends to every 
individual could support the perception that a carbon tax 
would affect some states and regions more than others, 
though these regional disparities may be overstated (see 
additional discussion in Sections 5.2.3 and 6.2.2). 
Various methods can be used to administer rebate checks 
in a fee-and-dividend program. Existing federal pro-
grams that disburse money, such as Social Security or the 
Temporary Assistance for Needy Families program, can 
supplement households’ monthly checks with carbon-tax 
revenues. For non-participants in those programs, the 
government can send a monthly check, or give annual tax 
refunds. All of these means of returning revenues carry 
various administrative burdens and costs. 
Several examples of redistributing revenues to households 
may be instructive to policymakers. In 2008, Switzerland 
implemented a carbon tax on hydrocarbon fuels, which 
applies to all individuals and those companies that do 
not participate in the national cap-and-trade program. 
Revenues are redistributed to taxpayers in the form of 
lower health insurance premiums for individuals, and 
are returned to companies based on their total payroll. 
While few studies have analyzed the economic impacts 
of Switzerland’s carbon tax, since its implementation in 
2008 Switzerland has kept pace with, or exceeded, other 
developed countries in a variety of economic indicators.83 
In the United States, there is precedent for recycling 
revenues to households, though as part of very different 
programs. The Alaska Permanent Fund returns a portion 
of that state’s oil revenues to its citizens every year. 
And California is recycling some of the revenue from its 
allowance auctions back to households in the form of 
semi-annual rebates on electricity bills, administered by 
the investor-owned utilities (IOUs) in the state, as directed 
by the California Public Utilities Commission. The revenue 
for the rebates comes from a reverse auction of allowances 
that were distributed to investor-owned utilities under the 
cap-and-trade program rules. 
5.2.3. Address Regional Disparities
Some regions in the United States are more heavily 
dependent on the production or consumption of fossil 
fuels than others, and so will be differently affected by the 
implementation of a carbon price. A reduction in demand 
for coal, for example, could have adverse impacts on the 
coal-producing regions of Wyoming, West Virginia, and 
Kentucky, among other states.84 Residents of states that 
get most of their electricity from coal would likely see their 
monthly electric bills increase in the near term. Many 
households in the Northeast, heavily reliant on heating oil, 
would see wintertime energy costs increase.85 
However, recent analysis suggests that regional dispari-
ties in the consumption of carbon-intensive goods are not 
as great as once feared.86 Regions that are more heavily 
dependent on one fossil fuel tend to be relatively less 
dependent on others—for example, while the Northeastern 
states burn more oil for home heating, their electricity mix 
is relatively less dependent on coal (see Figures 6 and 7).87 
Figure 6   |  Primary Home Heating Fuel, by Census Division
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Source: “Everywhere but Northeast, Fewer Homes Choose Natural Gas as Heating Fuel,” U.S. Energy Information Administration, September 25, 2014,  
http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=18131. 
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*Includes generation by agricultural waste, landfill gas recovery, municipal solid waste, wood, geothermal, nonwood waste, wind, and solar.
Source: “Different Regions of the Country Use Different Fuel Mixes to Generate Electricity,” Edison Electric Institute, August 2014,  
http://www.eei.org/issuesandpolicy/generation/fueldiversity/Documents/map_fuel_diversity.pdf. 
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Figure 7   |  Electricity Generation Fuel Mix, by Region
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As Tufts University Economics Professor Gilbert Metcalf 
has found, returning carbon-pricing revenues to house-
holds via payroll tax reductions and Social Security can all 
but eliminate regional disparities while making all regions 
better off.88
Nevertheless, such concerns were a major sticking point 
in the debate surrounding how to apportion allowance 
revenue under the American Clean Energy and Security 
Act (ACES). To mitigate against increases in energy prices 
that would affect some regions more than others, the bill’s 
authors devoted some allowance revenue to electricity 
and natural gas local distribution companies, as well as 
state programs that support home heating. The notion 
that some regions would be more adversely affected than 
others will likely be a contentious issue in any political 
debate surrounding a carbon price. This issue is discussed 
in more detail in Section 6, below.
5.2.4. Invest in Economic Competitiveness
Many industries, especially manufacturing, rely heavily on 
energy derived from fossil fuels as a primary input. There 
is concern that, if a price on carbon results in the prices 
of those fuels increasing to the point that it is cheaper for 
companies to relocate their operations elsewhere, some 
manufacturing jobs could be lost. While recent studies 
suggest that this may be less of a problem than previously 
thought (see Section 6.4), many advocates of a national 
climate policy call for measures to ensure that American 
industry remains competitive in the global marketplace. In 
a cap-and-trade program, this can be achieved by distrib-
uting free allowances to industries identified as vulner-
able to competitive pressures because of the carbon price 
(often called energy-intensive trade-exposed industries). 
Under a carbon tax, the most frequently discussed cor-
responding policy tool is a border adjustment, whereby 
imports from countries without equivalent policies are 
assessed a tariff based on the carbon content of their 
goods, and exports given a rebate of the tax paid in the 
manufacture of the good. If the trading partner has a 
climate policy in place that implicitly or explicitly prices 
carbon emissions equivalently to the U.S. domestic carbon 
tax, the border adjustment can be waived. If the trading 
partner has a climate policy that is less stringent than 
that of the United States, the border adjustment can be 
reduced accordingly. This creates difficult questions for 
regulators, such as how to quantify the effect of regula-
tions that reduce emissions and how to determine the 
stringency of a suite of climate policies in other countries. 
Further discussion on border adjustments can be found in 
Section 6.2.3. We should also note that many of the United 
States’ largest trading partners already have carbon-pric-
ing policies in place. See Appendix A for more details.89
Of course, some portion of carbon-tax revenues can be 
returned to energy-intensive trade-exposed industries, as 
a means of sustaining international competitiveness (and 
if the corporate income tax rate is cut as part of a carbon-
tax swap, many of these companies will already receive 
a tax break). As long as the revenue is not returned to 
these industries on the basis of their emissions, the price 
signal to encourage companies to reduce their emissions 
will remain. However, returning revenues to energy-
intensive trade-exposed industries does not provide a way 
to address the fact that some other jurisdictions already 
apply a carbon price. 
Denmark instituted a carbon tax in 1992 and, since 1995, 
has been returning a portion of revenues to various indus-
tries. In order to advance the goal of changing industrial 
behavior in order to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, the 
Danish government also provides a 25 percent reduction 
in a company’s tax burden if it signs an agreement to take 
steps to reduce its energy use. The Danish carbon tax has 
proven effective at reducing emissions, especially from 
industry. Industrial emissions fell 23 percent in the decade 
following the implementation of the carbon tax, and per 
capita emissions in Denmark declined 15 percent between 
1990 and 2005.90 
Wind projects in Denmark also receive revenues from 
the country’s carbon tax, which has helped the country 
become a global leader in wind power. Denmark is home 
to the wind turbine manufacturing operations of Vestas 
and Siemens, which together have nearly 20 percent of 
global market share,91 and nearly 40 percent of Danish 
electricity consumption in 2014 came from wind power, 
the highest figure in the world.92 
5.3. Support Related Goals
5.3.1. Respond to Climate Change 
Some proponents of carbon pricing believe that revenue 
would be best spent on infrastructure that helps make 
communities more resilient to the impacts of climate 
change.93 Such investments can serve a variety of pur-
poses, including:
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 ▪ Increasing the resiliency of water, transport, energy, 
and other forms of infrastructure that are vulnerable 
to extreme weather and other effects of a changing 
climate
 ▪ Reducing emissions and improving the resiliency of 
the electric grid by building out renewable energy and 
distributed generation infrastructure, and expanding 
smart grids
 ▪ Creating jobs through the spending of public money 
on needed investments in adaptation and resilience
Spending some carbon-tax revenues on adaptation allows 
for a carbon tax to address both the causes and effects of 
greenhouse gas emissions simultaneously.94 The World 
Bank estimates that global investments to adapt to a 
changing climate will need to reach $70-100 billion per 
year through 2050—and even more if warming exceeds 
two degrees Celsius.95 Estimates of adaptation costs in the 
United States vary widely, but could reach tens of billions 
of dollars per year by the middle of the century.96 
Governments can also choose to spend revenues from a 
carbon tax on clean-energy initiatives designed to achieve 
additional emissions reductions, and possibly reduce the 
costs of complying with the carbon price. These initiatives 
can take the form of investments in renewable energy, 
demand-side or supply-side energy efficiency, building 
retrofits, or other measures designed to reduce the carbon 
intensity of energy use.
There are precedents for governments investing carbon-
pricing revenues to help spur additional emissions 
reductions, though on a smaller scale. Germany currently 
devotes all revenues from its allowance auctions to domes-
tic and international climate initiatives. These include 
“innovative projects” in Germany’s industrial sector, other 
energy-saving domestic initiatives, and international 
climate finance to help spur emissions reductions in other 
countries.97 In the United States, RGGI states devoted 
over 70 percent of allowance auction revenues to energy 
efficiency and renewable energy projects between 2009 
and 2012—measures that RGGI estimates will avoid eight 
million tons of CO2 emissions and save consumers more 
than $2 billion in energy savings.98
5.3.2. Encourage Investment in Clean  
Technology Innovation 
By changing the relative prices of goods, and creating 
financial incentives to reduce emissions, a price on carbon 
can stimulate innovation. Alone or in conjunction with 
complementary policies (as discussed in Section 4.4), 
a carbon price encourages companies to develop new, 
cleaner, more cost-effective technologies and processes. As 
the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Develop-
ment has written:
“…environmentally related taxes can provide signifi-
cant incentives for innovation, as firms and consum-
ers seek new, cleaner solutions in response to the 
price put on pollution. These incentives also make it 
commercially attractive to invest in R&D activities to 
develop technologies and consumer products with a 
lighter environmental footprint, either by the polluter 
or by a third-party innovator… Even for firms that do 
not have the resources or inclination to undertake for-
malised R&D activities, the presence of environmen-
tally related taxation provides increased incentives to 
bring in the latest technologies that have already been 
developed elsewhere.” 99
It is highly unlikely that a low to moderate carbon tax 
would achieve the level of emissions reductions the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) 
recommends in order to prevent the worst impacts of 
climate change.100 Therefore, some supporters of a carbon 
tax propose using some revenue to encourage innovation 
in technologies or practices that could help reduce green-
house gas emissions.101 The federal government already 
invests in research and development—the Department of 
Energy supports renewable energy, fossil energy, nuclear 
energy, and energy efficiency—and those programs have 
paid dividends in the form of technological advancement 
and lower costs to businesses and consumers.102 But, while 
we can make significant emissions reductions with tech-
nology available today, in order to achieve much deeper 
emissions reductions by mid-century we will need either 
innovative breakthroughs or continuous improvements in 
the existing suite of technologies, or both. 
Devoting some carbon-tax revenue to R&D can potentially 
help to reduce the long-term costs of complying with the 
tax and reducing emissions, in several ways. First, as 
reaffirmed in a pair of 2014 reports, both the public and 
private sectors often underinvest in innovation:103
“Financing for research and development in the power 
sector does not match the scale of the challenge [of 
reducing emissions]. Power company funds spent on 
research and development were only $280 million in 
2011, or approximately 0.05 percent of power sec-
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Notes:
a. If payroll or other labor taxes are cut, there could be a small improvement in the overall progressivity of the tax code, which could address income inequality in a modest way. If carbon tax 
revenues are used to reduce corporate income taxes, any such effect would be muted.
b. Depending on whether and how additional revenue is raised from alternative sources.
c. Proponents of a fee-and-dividend approach claim that it will foster economic growth, but the economic literature is divided on this. See Section 6 for more detail. 
d. The revenue neutrality of returning all carbon-tax revenues to households in the form of dividends is in the eye of the beholder. Some proponents, such as Citizens Climate Lobby, believe 
fee-and-dividend to be revenue neutral (see https://citizensclimatelobby.org/carbon-fee-and-dividend/). Others disagree, pointing to the need to devote some revenues to the administration of 
the program, and the belief that dividends are a form of government spending and not tax reduction.
e. The evidence is mixed as to whether these revenue uses achieve the stated policy goals.
Table 3   |  Revenue Options, and the Policy Goals they are Designed to Achieve
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tor sales. By comparison, company funds spent on 
research and development were 11 percent of sales 
for pharmaceuticals, eight percent for computers and 
electronics, five percent for professional services, and 
three percent for general manufacturing.” 104 
Government support of research, development, and dem-
onstration of measures to reduce emissions from energy, 
transportation, agriculture, or other sectors can fill the 
gap created by private sector underinvestment, and help 
bring down the costs of breakthrough technologies. This, 
in turn, could help to drive more cost-effective emissions 
reductions and reduce the cost of complying with the car-
bon tax.105 Polls suggest that public support for a carbon 
tax grows when revenue is used for R&D (though many 
polls do not ask respondents what level of tax they would 
be comfortable with).106 
5.4. Mixing and Matching
Of course, policymakers will likely choose several options 
for using carbon-price revenues, and divide the money 
between them. In this way, a carbon-pricing policy can 
achieve (or contribute to achieving) a number of the goals 
outlined in this section. For example, in its analysis of a 
federal cap-and-trade program, the Center for Budget and 
Policy Priorities found that only 14 percent of allowance 
Figure 8  |   Cumulative Distribution of Allowances Under ACES, 2012-2050
Source: “Distribution of Allowances Under the American Clean Energy and Security Act (Waxman-Markey),” Pew Center on Global Climate Change, August 2009, http://www.c2es.org/
docUploads/policy-memo-allowance-distribution-under-waxman-markey.pdf. 
Consumers (Electricity, natural gas, home heating, 
low-income, etc.) 58%
Technology (Renewables, Efficiency, CCS, Autos, etc.) 15%
Energy-Intensive, Trade-Vulnerable Industries 8%
Adaptation (Domestic & International) 7%
Prevention of Tropical Deforestation 4%
Merchant Coal Generators & Long-term Power 3%
Other (Early actors, worker transition, deficit reduction) 2%
Strategic Reserve 2%
Domestic Fuel Production 1%
auction revenue was needed to ensure that the bottom 
quintile of the income distribution was not adversely 
affected by higher energy prices.107 The 2009 ACES Act 
followed this guidance and devoted about 15 percent 
of allowance revenue to lower income households. To 
achieve a variety of policy goals, the bill’s authors also 
proposed giving free allowances (or devoting allowance 
revenue) to electricity and natural gas distribution com-
panies to protect consumers from higher energy prices, to 
energy-intensive and trade-exposed industries, to innova-
tion and R&D, and for adaptation investments (see Figure 
8).108
California is currently putting many of those principles 
into practice.109 In addition to the semi-annual rebates 
on electricity bills mentioned above, the state is devoting 
some of its allowance revenue to transportation infrastruc-
ture (including high-speed rail and other mass transit), 
affordable housing, energy- and water-efficiency projects, 
support for low-income and minority communities, and 
several other smaller programs.110 While distributing 
revenues across a variety of end-uses can diminish the 
effectiveness in achieving certain policy goals, it may allow 
a federal carbon-pricing program to address multiple pri-
orities. See Table 3 for a summary of how various revenue 
options can satisfy one or more policy goals.
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6. ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF A  
CARBON PRICE
Like other climate and tax policies, pricing carbon will 
necessarily have economic impacts. The economic litera-
ture on a carbon tax’s effects on economic growth and 
output, jobs, income, regional disparities, and industrial 
competitiveness is both deep and wide. These studies 
can tell us much about how a carbon tax can change an 
economy as it transitions from being highly dependent on 
fossil fuels toward a lower carbon future.
The design choices discussed in Section 4 help to deter-
mine the economic effects of a given carbon-pricing policy, 
among the most consequential decisions for policymakers 
in this regard is how to spend the revenues.
6.1. Macroeconomic Impacts
6.1.1. Effects of a Carbon Tax on Economic Growth
The effect of a carbon tax on economic growth depends 
greatly on the details of how the tax is designed, and espe-
cially on what is done with the resulting revenues. Studies 
have found that while some uses of carbon tax revenues 
would produce a net drag on economic growth, other uses 
would provide a net stimulus to the economy. Of course, 
as with all economic modeling, much depends on the 
modelers’ assumptions (see Box 6 for further discussion 
on the limits of economic modeling). Here, we review the 
economic literature to see how the choices made by poli-
cymakers regarding the structure of the tax and the use of 
revenues will affect economic growth.
CARBON TAX POLICY PROPOSALS AND THEIR  
EFFECTS ON ECONOMIC GROWTH
Economists have undertaken considerable modeling 
and research on the economic impacts of various policy 
proposals and uses of revenues; those most commonly 
suggested are discussed in Section 5. Here, we’ll review 
some of the economic literature to see how these revenue 
uses will impact growth.
REDUCING DISTORTIONARY TAXES. Using carbon tax revenue 
to “pay for” reductions in taxes on capital or labor can 
partially or fully offset the adverse effects of a carbon tax 
on economic growth, though there is disagreement among 
economists as to which of these uses of carbon tax revenue 
would lead to greater economic growth. Economists refer 
to taxes on capital and labor as distortionary, because 
they reduce the incentives to work and invest—generally, 
things that policymakers want to encourage in a healthy 
economy. By using carbon tax revenue to reduce existing 
tax rates on corporate income, personal income, or payroll 
taxes, policymakers can increase the incentives to work 
and invest while reducing the incentive to over-consume 
fossil fuels. For example, Parry et al. (2011) find that “if 
revenues are used to substitute for distortionary income 
taxes (either directly or indirectly through deficit reduc-
tion), economy-wide carbon taxes…may have (slightly) 
negative costs.”111
PROVIDING DIVIDENDS. Carbon-tax revenue can also be 
recycled to households on a monthly, quarterly, or annual 
basis, either via a new federal program or through any of 
a number of existing programs; these programs include, 
but are not limited to, Social Security, Supplemental 
Nutritional Assistance Program (SNAP, also called food 
stamps), or via annual tax returns (further discussion of 
federal programs that could be used to return revenues 
to households can be found in Section 5.2.2). Most 
economists believe such a policy would reduce economic 
efficiency, at least in the near- to medium-term. For 
example, Lawrence Goulder and Marc Hafstead find that 
a lump-sum rebate is worse for economic growth than 
using revenues to reduce either personal or corporate 
income tax rates.112 And, while a 2014 study by Regional 
Economic Models, Inc. (REMI) found that a “fee-and-
dividend” approach would yield small net positive impacts 
on economic growth, this study was not peer-reviewed and 
some experts have taken issue with its assumptions and 
findings.113 
FEDERAL DEFICIT REDUCTION. Large deficits are thought to 
act as a drag on the economy, because they crowd out pri-
vate sector investment, and interest payments on the debt 
reduce the amount of money that the federal government 
can spend on more constructive purposes. And if inter-
est payments rise (or are expected to rise) in the future, 
Congress may be forced to raise taxes to help defray those 
costs, further limiting output. Economists have mod-
eled the potential economic effects of carbon taxes with 
revenues used for federal deficit reduction by assuming, 
for example, that tax increases to reduce the debt are 
inevitable, and carbon taxes can reduce the need for some 
of these future tax increases. 
Carbone et al. (2013) find that a CO2 tax of $30 per ton, 
with all revenue used as a “down payment” to bring 
the debt down to a sustainable level, would lead to very 
minor GDP reductions in the near term, and either minor 
increases or decreases following 2030, depending on the 
choice of debt reduction measures for which carbon taxes 
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are substituted.114 Similarly, McKibbin et al. (2012) find 
that, to achieve a given level of deficit reduction, a carbon 
tax reduces GDP slightly less than an equivalent tax on 
labor and slightly more than an equivalent tax on capital. 
They conclude that a carbon tax “offers a way to help 
reduce the deficit and improve the environment, and do so 
with minimal disturbance to overall economic activity.”115
The potential advantages of reducing deficits are not pres-
ent only at the federal level. Eisenberg et al. (2014) see 
similar benefits for states that use a carbon tax to comply 
with federal carbon-pollution standards for power plants, 
using that revenue to reduce state deficits and lower other 
tax rates.116
6.1.2. Effects of a Carbon Price on Employment
From an environmental standpoint, the primary goal of 
a carbon tax is to reduce greenhouse gas emissions; a 
well-designed tax will entail some restructuring of the 
economy as a result of reductions in the use of carbon-
intensive fuels and the consumption of carbon-intensive 
goods. There is no consensus among economists on the 
effects of carbon pricing on overall employment levels in 
the near term, although it is well recognized that there will 
be “winners” and “losers” from different economic sectors, 
and most economists agree that any economic impacts will 
be limited in the long term. The non-partisan Congres-
sional Budget Office (CBO) found that “[w]orkers and 
investors in fossil-fuel industries (such as coal mining and 
oil extraction) and in energy-intensive industries (such 
as chemicals, metals, and transportation) would tend to 
experience comparatively large losses in income under 
a carbon tax because demand for their products would 
decline.”117 However, the same analysis found that job 
losses would be offset over time by job gains in low-emit-
ting energy industries (such as wind, solar, and nuclear) 
as well as the service sector and other industries that are 
comparatively less emissions-intensive. Further discus-
sion on how a carbon tax affects employment in different 
regions and sectors can be found in Section 6.2, below.
In the aggregate, because a carbon tax would affect prices 
throughout the economy, there would likely be shifts in 
employment levels within industries, though the impact 
on overall employment levels depends on the size of the 
tax and what is done with revenue, and is likely to be 
small. In a 2010 review of the literature, CBO found that 
a “gradually increasing tax on greenhouse gas emissions 
or a cap-and-trade program … would probably have only 
a small effect on total employment during the next few 
decades.”118 In addition, CBO found that initially “job 
Box 6  |  Limits of Economic Modeling
Economists build models that aim to simulate the conditions, 
operation, and behavior of real world economies. These models 
can be powerful tools to help economists understand and 
predict the behavior of economic actors, but they are necessarily 
simplifications, and have different strengths and weaknesses. 
They have some explanatory power, but they cannot predict the 
future. 
Some of the discrepancy between predicted and actual costs of 
new rules is the result of changes made by affected entities to 
mitigate costs once those rules are implemented. Like models 
from other disciplines designed to mimic real-world conditions, 
economic models are premised upon the theories, assumptions, 
and policy design choices of their creators, and those theories 
and assumptions may be flawed, incomplete, or unproven. 
Moreover, given the wide range of views in the economics 
profession, there is likely to be another economist—and another 
model—with contrasting assumptions and vastly different 
results. In this paper, we strive to present an unbiased view of 
different modeling results, noting when those results are largely 
in agreement with each other and when they are not.
According to previous analysis by WRI and others, economic 
models also have a history of overstating the costs of environ-
mental measures while undervaluing the benefits of action to 
address climate change.a We encourage readers to keep in mind 
that all the economic modeling results discussed in this section 
are estimates, and that changes to policy design that depart from 
what researchers have modeled, can have an impact on model-
ing results. 
Economic models are also limited in their ability to reflect 
the benefits of preserving “natural capital,” which includes 
resources such as forests, clean air, and clean water. When 
economic impacts are measured in terms of gross domestic 
product (that is, the total value of the goods and services in an 
economy), any degradation of natural capital will generally be 
unaccounted for. Economic models also typically fail to reflect 
the benefits of preserving other valuable resources (for example, 
minerals and fuels) or a stable climate. Thus the business-as-
usual or reference scenarios may be more optimistic than reality, 
once the impacts of climate change are reflected.
Notes:
a. On the tendency of industry and EPA models to overstate the costs of 
environmental regulations, see http://pdf.wri.org/factsheets/factsheet_for_
epa_regulations_cost_predictions_are_overstated.pdf. On the tendency 
for economic modeling to undervalue the benefits of acting on climate, 
see http://static.newclimateeconomy.report/wp-content/uploads/2014/08/
NCE_Chapter5_EconomicsOfChange.pdf. 
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losses from the industries that shrink would lower overall 
employment in the economy and raise the unemployment 
rate,” but over time most of these displaced workers would 
find jobs in less emissions-intensive industries and the 
economy would eventually return to full employment.119 
As discussed in Section 5, the OECD found that using 
carbon-tax revenue to reduce labor taxes would lead to faster 
growth in total employment than would be the case in the 
absence of such a tax swap.120 In the long run, carbon taxes 
are expected to improve  economic growth significantly by 
mitigating adverse effects of climate change, and overall 
employment tends to grow with the economy as a whole. 
Rausch and Reilly (2012) argue for using tax revenue 
to offset either capital or labor taxes, to avoid spending 
cuts on social welfare programs, to pay down the deficit, 
or a combination thereof. They find that any of these 
suggested uses would lead to improvements throughout 
the economy, including greater private spending and 
employment.121
There is some agreement in the economic literature that 
a well-designed carbon tax will not have a significant, 
adverse effect on employment, if revenues are directed in 
ways that can partially or fully offset any job losses. Fossil 
fuel extraction, heavy manufacturing, and other emis-
sions-intensive industries would be affected the most, and 
the transition could be difficult for many communities.122 
Job training programs and a steady and predictable rate of 
increase in the carbon tax rate could help mitigate any job 
losses, but those will likely take some time for their impact 
to be felt. Further discussion on how to mitigate negative 
impacts on heavy industry can be found in Section 6.2.3. 
6.2. Distributional Impacts
6.2.1. Effects of a Carbon Tax on Income
A carbon tax increases the price of carbon-intensive fuels 
and, in the absence of any offsetting use of revenue, lower 
income households would bear a proportionally greater 
burden than higher income households because they tend 
to spend a higher proportion of their income on energy.123 
For example, CBO has found that a carbon tax of $28 per 
metric ton of CO2 emissions would increase after-tax costs 
for the average household in the lowest quintile of the 
income distribution by 2.5 percent; for households in the 
top quintile, the carbon tax would increase after-tax costs 
by only one percent.124 Marron and Toder (2013) found 
similar regressivity from a $20 per ton carbon tax—a 1.8 
percent burden on the pre-tax income of the lowest quin-
tile, but only a 0.7 percent burden on the top quintile.125  At 
the extreme ends of the income distribution, the regres-
sivity of a carbon tax is even more pronounced—Mathur 
and Morris (2012) found that an illustrative carbon tax of 
$15 per ton would account for 3.5 percent of income for 
households in the bottom decile, but only 0.6 percent in 
the top decile.126
Several studies—including Mathur and Morris (2012), 
Dower and Zimmerman (1992), and Hassett et al. (2007) 
—find that a carbon tax is comparatively less regres-
sive when looking at impacts on consumption instead 
of income. For example, when measuring the effect of a 
carbon tax on consumption, Mathur and Morris estimate 
that the same $15 per ton tax would reduce consumption 
in the bottom decile by 2.1 percent, and in the top decile 
by 1.3 percent.
Due to this greater proportional burden on the poor than 
the rich, a carbon tax is considered a regressive tax, but 
this regressivity can be addressed through a variety of 
ways of returning revenues to lower income households. 
Williams et al. (2014) find that, while using carbon-price 
revenue to cut capital taxes improves economic efficiency, 
it exacerbates the regressivity of a carbon tax.127  The 
authors found that using the revenue to provide dividends 
to households, however, would mean that the lower three 
quintiles of the income distribution would see a net benefit 
from the policy. Using revenues to reduce taxes on labor 
falls in between these two options, doing more to help 
lower income households than cutting capital taxes, but 
doing less than providing lump-sum dividends.
Eisenberg et al. (2014) suggest that, to offset regressivity, 
tax revenues could go toward safety net programs that 
benefit the poor.128 While this study analyzed state-level 
carbon taxes as a means for complying with carbon pollu-
tion standards for power plants, the same approach could 
be used at the federal level. Existing federal programs 
that assist lower income families and individuals, and 
could be vehicles for distributing tax revenues to various 
constituencies, include Social Security, the Earned Income 
Tax Credit, Temporary Assistance for Needy Families, 
the Low Income Home Energy Assistance Program, and 
the Supplemental Nutritional Assistance Program (also 
called food stamps), among others. Other approaches 
include targeted tax cuts, such as the “environmental 
earned income tax credit” as proposed by Metcalf (2008), 
or including Social Security recipients in any payroll tax 
reduction (see Table 4) (Metcalf 2009).129 Metcalf pro-
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Table 4   |  Income Effects of a Carbon Tax, and Various Proposals to Reduce Regressivity
Source: Metcalf, G. 2009. “Designing a Carbon Tax to Reduce U.S. Greenhouse Gas Emissions.” Review of Environmental Economics and Policy, Vol. 3, Iss. 1, Winter. Available at: http://reep.
oxfordjournals.org/content/3/1/63.full.pdf+html 
Note: Illustrative example using a carbon tax of $15 per metric ton (in 2005 dollars). Positive numbers represent an increase in income, and negative numbers represent a decrease in income. 
“Tax credit” refers to a proposal to use carbon tax revenues to reduce payroll taxes, up to the first $560 in taxes owed. “Earned income and Social Security” is a proposal whereby Social 
Security recipients also receive a $560 rebate. And “Lump sum” is the effects of a proposal to return all revenues to households in the form of per capita lump-sum rebates of $274. 
Change in Disposable Income ($) Change as a Percentage of Income
Income Group 
(decile)
Carbon tax Tax credit Net Carbon tax Tax credit Net
1 (lowest) -276 208 -68 -3.4 2.7 -0.7
2 -404 284 -120 -3.1 2.1 -1
3 -485 428 -57 -2.4 2.2 -0.2
4 -551 557 6 -2 2.1 0.1
5 -642 668 26 -1.8 1.9 0.1
6 -691 805 115 -1.5 1.8 0.3
7 -781 915 135 -1.4 1.6 0.2
8 -883 982 99 -1.2 1.4 0.2
9 -965 1035 70 -1.1 1.1 0
10 (highest) -1224 1093 -130 -0.8 0.8 0
Earned Income Earned Income and Social Security Lump Sum
Income Group 
(decile)
Net ($) Net (%) Net ($) Net (%) Net ($) Net (%)
1 (lowest) -68 -0.7 112 1.4 166 2.1
2 -120 -1 125 1 128 1
3 -57 -0.2 114 0.6 120 0.6
4 6 0.1 70 0.3 103 0.4
5 26 0.1 54 0.1 108 0.3
6 115 0.3 66 0.1 26 0.1
7 135 0.2 35 0.1 -32 -0.1
8 99 0.2 -61 -0.1 -52 -0.1
9 70 0 -95 -0.1 -171 -0.2
10 (highest) -130 0 -332 -0.2 -355 -0.2
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poses reducing payroll taxes for individuals up to a certain 
level of income, while ensuring that workers with low 
income tax liability receive enough support to ensure they 
are not adversely affected.
Estimates of how much revenue is needed to offset much 
of this regressivity are more or less consistent across 
studies. Morris and Mathur (2014) find that ensuring the 
bottom 20 percent of households (those with incomes less 
than 150 percent of the poverty line) are not made worse 
off by a carbon tax would require about 15 percent of the 
revenue from the tax.130 The analysis in Rosenbaum et al. 
(2009) of the Waxman-Markey cap-and-trade bill from 
2009 found that the bill’s provision that 15 percent of auc-
tion revenue be returned to low-income households would 
ensure that households in the bottom income quintile 
were made slightly better off, on average. A cap-and-trade 
program that auctions off all allowances functions in many 
ways like a carbon tax, so the findings are relevant to a 
carbon tax as well. For reference, CBO’s analysis of the 
Waxman-Markey bill found that, in 2020, the bill’s provi-
sions for returning revenue to consumers meant that the 
average household in the bottom income quintile would 
see a net benefit of $125 per year. The other four quintiles 
would see a net annual cost, on average, as follows: second 
quintile $150, third quintile $310, fourth quintile $375, 
and top quintile $165.131 
6.2.2. Regional Implications of a Carbon Tax
Gasoline, coal-fired electricity, and oil for home heating 
will all get more expensive under a carbon tax. Differing 
consumption patterns and fuel mixes in the electric grid 
between states and regions mean that a carbon tax will 
affect consumers differently depending on where they 
live. For example, the average driver in Wyoming drives 
nearly 22,000 miles per year—more than twice as far as 
drivers in Alaska and the District of Columbia.132 In 2012, 
92 percent of the electricity generated in Kentucky came 
from coal, while in Idaho that figure was less than one 
percent.133 And carbon-heavy heating oil is a significant 
source of space heating in the Northeast, while much of 
the rest of the country relies much more heavily on less 
carbon-intensive fuels like natural gas, propane, or grid 
electricity to heat homes in wintertime (however, in states 
that are most heavily dependent on coal for electricity 
production, heating oil can be a less emissions-intensive 
method of home heating than grid electricity).134 Neverthe-
less, as discussed below, some policy options for returning 
revenues to households can make all regions better off.
The Congressional Budget Office states that “[p]eople in 
regions of the country that rely on emission- intensive 
industries for their livelihood or that use the most emis-
sion-intensive fuels to produce power” are likely to bear 
a larger burden from the imposition of a carbon tax than 
others, and “[p]arts of the country that rely on fossil fuels 
or energy-intensive production for income would experi-
ence larger losses than other regions.”135 Policymakers 
concerned with such effects have tools at their disposal to 
offset any increases in energy prices. For example, ACES 
devoted 23 percent of revenue in the early years to local 
electricity and natural gas distribution companies, to 
combat higher prices for those commodities.136 
Yet it is important not to focus just on electricity use, 
transportation costs, or any other single aspect of con-
sumption, but rather to look at regional energy use and 
spending patterns more holistically. Morris and Mathur 
(2014) find that “regional analyses show that the burdens 
of a carbon tax as a share of income would not vary nearly 
as much as many fear,” because different regions have 
different consumption patterns for carbon-intensive goods 
and fuels, but relatively similar consumption patterns for 
non-energy goods and services.137 That said, they find that 
Wisconsin, Illinois, Ohio, Indiana, and Michigan could 
see a slightly higher burden from a carbon tax due to 
their high gasoline consumption and greater total energy 
consumption as a share of income.
Morris and Mathur are not alone in their conclusions, 
though the details do vary between studies. Metcalf also 
finds that a gradually increasing tax of $15 per ton CO2 
equivalent “does not appear to disproportionately burden 
one region of the country” after revenue is returned to 
households (Metcalf 2009). In analyzing the regional dis-
tribution effects of a carbon tax, Metcalf finds that, when 
revenues are returned via a payroll tax credit, there is a 
mere 0.6 percent difference in earned income between the 
hardest hit region (Alabama, Kentucky, Mississippi, Ten-
nessee) and the regions least affected by the tax (the upper 
Midwest and the Mountain West). And when revenues 
are returned to households via a combination of payroll 
tax reductions and Social Security rebates, this income 
discrepancy drops to 0.4 percent, with all regions better 
off (see Table 5).
Hassett et al. found less in the way of regional effects in a 
2009 study analyzing the impacts of a tax of $15 per ton of 
carbon dioxide emissions from fossil fuels when measured 
on a lifetime basis. The authors found that regional varia-
tion in the burden from the carbon tax was modest even 
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though their analysis did not look at uses of revenue, and 
that “variation across regions is sufficiently small that one 
could argue that a carbon tax is distributionally neutral 
across regions.”138 
Williams et al. (2014) found that, while a carbon tax would 
have a regionally diverse impact on electricity prices due 
to differing fuel mixes, those regional variations could be 
minimized through revenue recycling.139 Using carbon-tax 
revenues to reduce taxes on capital would reduce the bur-
den of the carbon tax, but do little to correct for regional 
disparities. A lump-sum rebate would be more beneficial 
for evening out the incidence of the carbon tax across 
regions but would lower overall welfare compared to a 
capital tax reduction. Reducing taxes on labor, however, 
nearly eliminated regional disparities in the incidence of 
the carbon tax, while providing much of the same eco-
nomic benefit as reducing taxes on capital.
Source: Metcalf (2009). 
Notes: Illustrative example using a carbon tax of $15 per metric ton (in 2005 dollars). Positive numbers represent an increase in income, and negative numbers represent a decrease in 
income. “Earned income and Social Security” is a proposal whereby Social Security recipients also receive a $560 rebate. And “Lump sum” is the effects of a proposal to return all revenues to 
households in the form of per capita lump sum rebates of $274. Regions are defined as follows: New England (Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, Vermont); 
Middle Atlantic (New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania); East North Central (Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, Ohio, Wisconsin); West North Central (Iowa, Kansas, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, 
North Dakota, South Dakota); South Atlantic (Florida, Georgia, Maryland, North Carolina, South Carolina, Virginia, West Virginia); East South Central (Alabama, Kentucky, Mississippi, 
Tennessee); West South Central (Arkansas, Louisiana, Oklahoma, Texas); Mountain (Arizona, Colorado, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, Utah, Wyoming); and Pacific (Alaska, California, 
Hawaii, Oregon, Washington). 
Table 5   |  Regional Distribution Effects of a Carbon Tax, With Two Proposals for Revenue Use
Earned Income and Social Security Lump Sum
Region Net ($) Net (%) Net ($) Net (%)
New England -36 0.2 -65 -0.1
Middle Atlantic -13 0.2 -18 -0.2
East North Central -14 0.1 -37 -0.1
West North Central 52 0.5 -26 -0.2
South Atlantic 17 0.3 2 0.3
East South Central -6 0.3 -75 -0.2
West South Central -42 0.2 9 0.4
Mountain 46 0.5 34 0.4
Pacific -4 0.2 59 0.6
10 (highest) -332 -0.2 -355 -0.2
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6.2.3. Impact of a Carbon Price on Industrial 
Competitiveness
Some emissions-intensive industries could see a decline 
in demand for their products under a carbon tax. Some 
of those industries, such as electricity generation, don’t 
face competition from U.S. trade partners, simply because 
the vast majority of what is produced is not imported 
or exported.140 Other emissions-intensive industries, 
however, such as steel, chemicals, and other large energy 
users, do face such competition, and higher prices on 
inputs could raise concerns that the United States will be 
a less attractive location for manufacturing and will lose 
international competitiveness, at least in the near term. 
However, these concerns may be unfounded, because 
many of the United States’ largest trading partners already 
have carbon-pricing policies in place (see Appendix A for 
more information on those countries’ policies). 
A 2009 interagency report assessing the impact of a 
national cap-and-trade program on international com-
petitiveness found that, on average, energy expenditures 
account for less than two percent of the value of U.S. 
manufacturing output, and that the majority of industries 
would not be noticeably adversely affected by a carbon 
price.141 Meanwhile, only 44 of the 500 largest manufac-
turing industries qualified as trade-exposed, accounting 
for 12 percent of total manufacturing output and just six 
percent of manufacturing employment, although they 
were responsible for nearly half of all greenhouse gas 
emissions from manufacturing. 
Even a small increase in energy costs could make a big 
difference in industries with tight profit margins, however, 
so it is important for policymakers to take steps to address 
the reduced competitiveness of some industries. Under a 
cap-and-trade program, allowances can be freely allocated 
to vulnerable industries to mitigate their trade exposure. 
Under a carbon tax, however, the most direct way to cor-
rect the disadvantage to these industries may be through 
a border adjustment. In this way, imports from countries 
without comparable carbon pricing policies would be sub-
ject to a tariff according to the carbon content of the good, 
and exports to such countries would have at least some 
of their tax burden reduced. Implicit in such a measure is 
an inducement to our trading partners to enact their own 
carbon-pricing policies. Harmonized policies would have 
the advantage of generating domestic tax revenues rather 
than tariff payments to other countries, and the potential 
for a more effective multi-country effort to reduce emis-
sions. Metcalf (2010) asserts that a border adjustment 
under a carbon tax is more likely to be compliant with 
World Trade Organization (WTO) rules than similar mea-
sures under a cap-and-trade program.142
Border tax adjustments are not without risk and some 
measure of controversy. First, compliance with WTO rules 
is not a given, though the WTO has acknowledged that it is 
possible to design a border tax for environmental reasons 
without running afoul of its rules.143 The border adjust-
ment must be designed in such a way that it does not favor 
domestically produced goods, or imports from certain 
countries.144 If a provision were written in a way that takes 
into account the carbon-pricing policies of our trading 
partners, many (though not all) experts believe a U.S. 
carbon tax could pass muster with the WTO, though it 
could be challenged by other countries.145 Second, a border 
adjustment has the potential to spark trade disputes if 
some countries believe that they are being unfairly singled 
out and retaliate with import tariffs of their own.146 Lastly, 
border adjustments can be burdensome to implement, 
because the carbon content of a vast array of imported 
goods will be so difficult to determine.147
7. CONCLUSION
In this Handbook, we have laid out the fundamental 
choices available to policymakers considering policies that 
put an explicit price on carbon emissions. Most of these 
decisions will be the results of political compromises, and 
there are a number of precedents in the recent past for 
cooperation on this issue. While we can’t predict what 
the future might hold for carbon pricing and views differ 
sharply on some issues, a number of factors are in play 
that could increase the appeal of such a policy to different 
parts of the political spectrum in the United States in the 
coming years.
Bipartisan support for federal tax reform 
The past five years have seen increasing calls for an 
overhaul of the federal tax code. Observers on both sides 
of the aisle, along with businesses and individual taxpay-
ers, find it to be overly onerous and complicated, yet full of 
loopholes that allow individuals or companies to pay less 
than their fair share of taxes. The top marginal corporate 
tax rate is the highest in the developed world, yet a wide 
array of deductions means that the effective corporate 
tax rate is far lower, and closer to the average effective 
tax rate of other developed countries.148 The tax code is 
also full of conflicting incentives; for example, fossil-fuel 
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companies receive subsidies and targeted tax breaks, 
even as renewable-energy companies receive tax credits 
and subsidies for production and investment. All of these 
complications and inconsistencies in the tax code have 
led many in Congress to call for significant tax reform. In 
recent years, Republican and Democratic members of the 
Senate Finance Committee have discussed simplifying the 
tax code by replacing most or all energy subsidies and tax 
credits with a carbon tax or cap-and-dividend program.149 
Stated goals for deeper reductions in  
GHG emissions 
Under President Obama, the United States now has a plan 
in place to meet its near- and medium-term emissions 
reduction targets, and to continue driving reductions in 
emissions from the largest emitting sectors in the years 
beyond. However, analysis by WRI has shown that admin-
istrative actions alone are likely insufficient to meet our 
long-term emissions target of roughly 83 percent below 
2005 levels by 2050.150 In short, the United States will 
need a comprehensive, economy-wide climate policy, such 
as a carbon tax or cap-and-trade program, if the country 
is to achieve the level of reductions that the IPCC says will 
be necessary from developed nations to avoid the worst 
impacts of climate change. 
Desire for alternative climate policies 
A price on carbon is both a fiscal and an environmental 
policy. In addition to using revenues to “pay for” reduc-
tions in other taxes, as discussed above, some proponents 
advocate an economy-wide carbon price as an approach 
that is preferable to imposing sectoral emission standards, 
while others view such standards as important tools in 
their own right or as potentially complementary climate 
policies. 
Bipartisan support for deficit reduction 
While concerns about the national debt have subsided 
to some extent in the past few years, reducing long-term 
debt remains an issue with significant support from the 
general public and lawmakers on both sides of the aisle. A 
national carbon tax has the potential to raise hundreds of 
billions of dollars per year that could be used to improve 
the United States’ long-term fiscal situation.    
Experience at the state level 
In the absence of a national, economy-wide policy 
to reduce GHG emissions, some states have moved 
forward with their own carbon-pricing mechanisms. 
As discussed above, nine northeastern states operate 
a regional electricity sector cap-and-trade program, 
and California in 2012 initiated its own economy-wide 
cap-and-trade program. As of this writing, stakeholders 
in Massachusetts, Oregon, Vermont, and Washington, 
among others, are advocating for a carbon tax to raise 
revenue for transportation infrastructure or other 
purposes. And in response to the flexibility afforded them 
under the Clean Power Plan, many states are actively 
considering whether carbon pricing offers the least-cost 
way of complying with GHG emissions standards for 
power plants. Successful implementation of these policies 
at the state level could lessen resistance at the federal level 
for a similar carbon-pricing policy.
Increased awareness of  
climate-related impacts 
From sea-level rise in Florida and Virginia, to increases 
in the frequency and severity of some types of extreme 
weather events, to protracted droughts in Texas and Cali-
fornia, the United States is already seeing previews of what 
a warming planet holds in store. As climate impacts hit 
home, and their effects begin taking a toll on the economy, 
we might see public opinion become increasingly vocal on 
the need to act. A climate policy that puts a price on GHG 
emissions throughout the economy offers policymakers a 
proven, market-based solution to reduce the U.S. contri-
bution to climate change and to raise revenues that can be 
invested in technologies that enable communities to better 
adapt to the impacts of climate change.
While none of these factors alone will likely be enough 
to move Congress to put a price on carbon in the com-
ing years, their confluence suggests a gradual mounting 
of pressure that could turn the tide. The world and the 
American people are increasingly serious about the need 
to act to avoid the worst impacts of climate change.151 A 
comprehensive carbon-pricing policy provides the oppor-
tunity to satisfy a variety of political goals beyond emis-
sions reductions. We hope that this working paper—and 
future briefing papers that will dive more deeply into 
many of the issues raised here—can play a helpful role in 
the coming national conversation on these issues.
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COUNTRY YEAR IMPLEMENTED PRICE PER TON CO2E 
PORTION OF GHGS 
COVERED (%) REVENUE USAGE
152
Finland 1990  ▪ €35 ($48) for 
heating fuels
 ▪ €60 ($83) for 
liquid traffic fuels
15  ▪ Reduce income taxes
 ▪ Increase government revenue
Norway 1991 Nkr25 to 419 ($4-69) 
in 2014; depending on 
fuel type and usage
50  ▪ Increase government revenue
Sweden 1991 Skr1076 ($168) 25  ▪ Increase government revenue
 ▪ Offset labor taxes
Denmark 1992 Dkr167 ($31 in 2014) 45  ▪ 40 percent used as environmental subsidy
 ▪ 60 percent returned to industry
British 
Columbia
2008 C$30 ($28) in 
2013/14
70  ▪ Designed to be revenue neutral through income 
tax reductions and tax credits
 ▪ Revenue negative in practice - tax cuts and credits 
have exceeded carbon tax revenue
Switzerland 2008 SFr60 ($68) from 
2014
30  ▪ Dividend redistributed proportionally to industry 
and consumers
 ▪ Fund climate-friendly building renovations
Iceland 2010 Íkr1120 ($10) 50  ▪ Increase government revenue
Ireland 2010  
(extended to solid 
fuels in 2013)
€20 ($28) from May 
2014
40  ▪ Increase government revenue
 ▪ Reduce the deficit 
Japan 2012 ¥192 ($2) from April 
2014, increasing to 
¥289 ($3) in April 
2016
70  ▪ Invest in clean energy and energy efficiency
Table A.1   |  Carbon taxes around the world 
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Table A.1   |  Carbon taxes around the world (continued)
PER TO
Source: State and Trends of Carbon Pricing 2014, World Bank, Washington D.C. 2014. Dollar values are based on exchange rates as of December 31, 2013.
Notes: a.  Information from Reuters (“Chile becomes the first South American country to tax carbon,” Reuters, September 27, 2014) and Point Carbon (“Chile passes carbon tax,” Point 
Carbon,October 30, 2014). 
COUNTRY YEAR IMPLEMENTED PRICE PER TON CO2E 
PORTION OF GHGS 
COVERED (%) REVENUE USAGE
152
United 
Kingdom
2013  ▪ EU ETS price floor 
of £16 ($26.23)  
in 2013
 ▪ Effective tax in 
April 2014 of £9.55 
($15.75) 
25  ▪ Reduce other taxes
Mexico 2014  ▪ Mex$10-50  
($1-4), depending 
on fuel
Unclear – initial bill 
included natural 
gas and would have 
covered 40 percent
 ▪ Increase government revenue
France April 1, 2014  ▪ €7 ($10) 
increasing to €14.5 
($20) in 2015 and 
€22 ($30) in 2016
Initial coverage:  
35 percent
 ▪ Fund energy transition plans
South 
Africa
Implementation 
planned in 2016
 ▪ R120 ($12) in 
2016
 ▪ Increasing by 10 
percent per year 
through 2019, then 
subject to review
 ▪ During 2016-19, 
a basic tax-free 
threshold will 
be established, 
making the 
maximum effective 
tax rate R48 ($5)
80  ▪ Likely to be a reduction in VAT or income taxes
Chilea Goes into effect in 
2018
 ▪ $5 per ton
 ▪ No detail on price 
increases
no data  ▪ Educational developments on climate change
 ▪ Education system
Australia Initiated July 2012; 
repealed in 2014
 ▪ A$24.15 ($21.54) 
from July 2013 
60  ▪ Revenue neutral: Reduce income tax and provide 
dividend to energy producers and consumers
 ▪ Funded industry assistance programs
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Table A.2   |  National and Sub-National Greenhouse Gas Cap-and-Trade Programs Around the World
JURISDICTION YEAR IMPLEMENTED
EMISSIONS 
COVERED (%)
2013 
PRICE PER 
TON CO2E
COVERED SECTORS
European Union 2005 45 $9 Industry, electricity, aviation
New Zealand 2008 50 $1 Industry, forestry, transport, waste
Switzerland 2008 10 Electricity, buildings
U.S. Sub-national Programs
 ▪ Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative 
(RGGI) – NE United States
2009 20 $3 Electricity
 ▪ California  
(linked with Quebec)
2013 85 $11 From 2013: Industry, electricity; added in 
2015: transport, distributed use of fuels 
Australia
2012;  
repealed 2014
60 $21.54 
(fixed 
price)
All large emission sources, including industry, 
large gas consumers, and landfills
Canada Sub-national Program 
Quebec  
(linked with California)
 2013 85 $10 From 2013: Industry, electricity; added in 
2015: transport, distributed use of fuels 
Chinese Sub-national Pilots
Tianjin 2013 60 $4 Industry, electricity, buildings
Beijing 2013 50 $9 Industry, electricity, buildings
Shanghai 2013 50 $5 Industry, transport, electricity
Guangdong 2013 42 $10 Industry, electricity
Shenzhen 2013 38 $11 Industry, electricity, buildings
Chongqing 2014 38 Electricity
Hubei 2014 35 Industry, electricity
Kazakhstan 2013 50 Industry, transport, electricity, agriculture
South Korea 2015 (planned) 60 Industry, electricity
Source: World Bank, State and Trends of Carbon Pricing 2014, unless otherwise noted.  
Notes: 
This table does not include Alberta (Canada) or Tokyo, Saitama and Kyoto (Japan), which have initiated trading systems based on emissions intensity. 
California’s program went into effect in 2012, but the first year for which covered entities had emissions obligations was 2013. 
The portion of emissions covered in California and Quebec reflects the increase in scope at the start of 2015 to include transportation fuels and distributed use of natural gas and other fuels. 
Australia’s system, which has now been repealed, was initiated with a fixed price and was therefore, in its initial stages, a carbon tax. 
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